Report of the High-level Committee on Programmes at its seventh session

Beirut, 26-27 February 2004

1. At the invitation of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board (CEB) for Coordination held its seventh session held in Beirut, Lebanon, on 26-27 February.

2. On behalf of the Committee, the Chairman expressed appreciation to the Executive Secretary of ESCWA for hosting the seventh session of the Committee and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting, and to the Director of the Regional Commissions Office in New York, Ms. Sulafa Al-Bassam, and ESCWA staff for their invaluable support. He also warmly welcomed in the name of the Committee the new Secretary of the Committee, Ms. Phyllis Lee.

I. Preparations for the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination spring 2004 session

A. Multilateralism

3. The Committee discussed its contribution to the ongoing consideration of the issue of multilateralism by CEB. It had before it a note on the subject (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.1: The Future of Multilateralism — The Way Forward), as well as a background document mapping various initiatives on multilateral cooperation (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.1/Add.1). The analytical summary of the CEB retreat on multilateralism held in November 2003 was also made available by the Chairman to members of the Committee, with the consent of Board members.

4. The Chairman referred to the discussions on multilateralism at the meeting of the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) in September 2003 and at the CEB retreat in November 2003 as precious opportunities for the organizations of the system to share views and experiences, not only on the system’s response to challenges to multilateralism but also on ways for the system to contribute to a better governance of globalization. He hoped that the current discussion in the Committee would help advance this process of reflection from analysis to action by identifying concrete, actionable recommendations for consideration by the Board in
charting the way ahead. As part of that contribution, the Committee should keep itself informed of progress in the work of the various independent commissions and of the outcomes of similar initiatives under way, and seek both to identify system-wide implications and to promote synergies in the follow-up actions to be taken in the organizations concerned. This effort would, in turn, serve to enrich the system’s contribution to the 2005 review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and help orient the Committee’s own programme of work in the period ahead.

5. The representative of the International Labour Organization (ILO) circulated the report of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization and briefed the Committee on the background, objectives, and outcome of the Commission’s work. He also outlined the process involved in following up on the findings and recommendations of the Commission. Three basic ideas had guided the work of the Commission: (a) inclusive globalization was necessary also for the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) public opinion must see globalization as a positive force; and (c) the central importance of the United Nations system and of the rule of law in an increasingly interdependent world. In this light, the report of the Commission makes a strong case that markets alone are not adequate to deal with globalization and that efficient markets require effective Governments; highlights the perspective of those not benefiting from globalization; and calls for and identifies coordinated measures across a broad front to improve governance and accountability at both national and international levels.

6. The Project Director of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations updated the Committee on the state-of-play with the Panel’s work. Among the main considerations orienting the Panel’s work and its recommendations were: emphasis on partnerships; focus on the country level where the operational and deliberative sides of the United Nations system can converge; addressing democratic deficits and the evolution from representative to participatory democracy; and United Nations global leadership. Other issues to be covered by the Panel’s recommendations included: accreditation; management structures; civil society governance and selection; quality assurance; roles and policy environment for civil society; and civil society engagement with United Nations organs, including the Security Council.

7. The representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) then briefed the Committee on the Commission on the Private Sector and Development. Convened by the Secretary-General last year, the Commission is built on the premise that the Millennium Development Goals cannot be achieved without the private sector and its primary aim is to unleash the potential of the private sector to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The recommendations of the Commission will be followed up through various initiatives involving partnerships within the private sector, between the public and private sectors, and within the public sector covering enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.

8. Finally, the representative of the World Bank updated the Committee on its evaluation of global programmes. He referred to the three levels in which the evaluation was taking place — strategic, programmatic management, and case studies relating to individual programmes — involving an in-depth review of 68 global programmes. Phase 1 of the evaluation focusing on the Bank’s global
portfolio has been completed, and Phase 2, based on 26 case studies, was currently being finalized and expected to be completed before June 2004.

9. The Committee noted that, while the many ongoing initiatives on multilateral cooperation pursue different aims, the underlying considerations that had led to their establishment were at the centre of the concerns being addressed in CEB discussions on multilateralism: the need for a new, more comprehensive concept of security; the need to address social marginalization and exclusion; the promotion of universal values and international solidarity as the basis of a stable international system; and the need to engage and mobilize public sentiment in support of common goals. The challenge was how best to integrate the outcomes of these initiatives into the system’s collective thinking on multilateralism, and how the Committee itself would draw on them to further its reflections and contribution to discussions in the Board.

10. Central to advancing this reflection and to leading it towards positive, actionable conclusions is to develop a deeper understanding of the evolving environment of multilateral cooperation — the changing role of Governments; shifting perceptions of the role and relevance of the United Nations system; the role of the private sector as a force in globalization; the emergence of civil society; and growing disparities in the global economy and society. Indeed, a shift in focus appears to be taking place in the ongoing debate on multilateralism, from countering threats to multilateralism to deepening the understanding of its changing character and guiding its evolution to advance global goods. The traditional concept of multilateralism where central Governments agree on collective action and then move on to implementation is giving way to new forms of multilateralism that are multi-faceted and multi-stakeholder. While the traditional approach too often led to the lowest common denominator, what should be sought are the highest common principles. New multilateral approaches are outward-looking and outcome-oriented and place a premium on building multi-stakeholder partnerships and global policy networks, geared towards strengthening global governance in the changing context of multilateral cooperation. In this context, existing and recently established global forums, e.g., World Economic Forum, World Social Forum, World Urban Forum, are seen as advancing these new multilateral approaches.

11. Although much of the current reflection on the future of multilateralism was sparked by circumstances surrounding the Iraq war, the growing dissatisfaction of large segments of society throughout the world and particularly in developing countries over the perceived inability of the multilateral system to deliver on its promises is gaining centre place in these discussions. In this context, the various independent commissions and high-level panels should be seen, together, as instruments to revive support for the multilateral system by pointing to ways to adapt its processes to current requirements and circumstances and energize them as instruments for concrete progress. Despite a perceived lack of clear constituencies, they are a source of great potential strength for the system, in generating fresh ideas and alternative avenues for advancing collective approaches and contributing to developing the way forward in specific areas of interest.

12. While formal implementation of the recommendations of the commissions by the different organizations of the system will require specific mandates, it should nevertheless be possible for the system as a whole to draw on their ideas and insights to enhance its performance. The view was expressed that an important issue that would benefit from further in-depth examination in this context was how the
system is working together at the country level, and, in particular, the role of poverty reduction strategy papers in the national planning process and what further progress can be made in harmonizing or unifying country programming frameworks.

13. Many stressed that the system had all reasons to pursue the debate on the future of multilateralism with confidence, conscious of its accomplishments and of its capacity to adapt its modes of operations to changing requirements, and confident that the basic principles on which it is founded and its inherent strengths are more relevant than ever to the demands of a globalizing world. Indeed, the multilateral system remains strong overall. The many new international agreements and treaties signed by Member States in recent times, the increasingly important role that the United Nations system is called upon to play on a wide range of international issues, including its renewed involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq, underscore the vitality of the multilateral system. The many “reform” initiatives under way are further important signals of its capacity to evolve and continuously strengthen its performance. In this context, the increased engagement of non-State actors, such as local authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in the work of intergovernmental bodies was seen as an essential element in future reform of the United Nations.

14. The Committee acknowledged that the view of the international community as to the continuing relevance and effectiveness of the system and its ability to deliver significant, concrete results is greatly affected by the perception of its overall coherence and capacity for concerted action. The Millennium Declaration provides a common framework for action and offers a unique opportunity for the system collectively to make, and be seen to make, a difference. In this context, a stronger emphasis on economic development and a corresponding strengthening of coordination among the relevant United Nations entities were cited among the essential factors to promote concrete progress towards meeting the poverty reduction goals of the Declaration. The suggestion was made that a concrete way forward for the United Nations system in this regard would be to elaborate a business plan with agreed terms and tasks for the institutions involved.

15. In the light of the above discussion, and the note before it entitled “The future of multilateralism — the way forward” (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.1), the Committee elaborated a brief paper for submission to the Board, as a contribution to its continuing discussion on multilateralism.

16. The Committee decided to continue its consideration of issues related to multilateralism and in particular its review of developments in the work of various commissions and related initiatives, as sources of insights and inspiration in contributing to the 2005 review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and developing its future programme of work, and with a view to furthering synergies among these initiatives that can contribute to shaping the way forward for the system as a whole.

B. Curbing transnational crime

17. In preparation for the spring 2004 discussion on curbing transnational crime by the Chief Executives Board (CEB) — one of two main themes identified in the Secretary-General’s road map on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration for in-depth treatment in 2004 — the Committee had before it a note prepared
through inter-agency consultations led by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.2).

18. In introducing the note, the representative of the Office drew attention to a letter addressed by the Executive Director of UNODC to the Chairman of the Committee highlighting the system-wide implications and relevance of the issue of organized crime. The letter stressed that the multi-sectoral character of transnational crime requires a concerted and coordinated response by the United Nations system as a whole.

19. The Committee welcomed the note as a good basis for preparing the Board’s discussions. Members of the Committee put forward a number of suggestions. Among them:

– The proposed recommendations for action by the Board should be limited in number and well focused;

– Caution was recommended in introducing and quantifying concepts such as the “criminal divide”. The overall emphasis should be on the requirement for greater international cooperation to counter organized crime;

– Linkages between (a) organized crime and corruption; (b) organized crime and terrorism; and (c) organized crime and environmental threats should be further developed;

– Issues relating to rebuilding or reforming criminal justice systems and institutions as a key foundation in the fight against organized crime should be highlighted;

– United Nations organizations concerned, such as UNODC and the World Tourism Organization, should cooperate in raising international awareness of the need to combat sexual exploitation of children in tourism;

– Proposals on joint technical assistance to fight HIV/AIDS among trafficking victims should place greater emphasis on the requirement to build country capacities in this regard;

– The call on the mobilization of the system to promote the ratification of relevant conventions should be a broad one, not exclusively focused on the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

20. The note, as revised in the light of the above comments, and other inputs received by the Office following the Committee meeting, is attached.

C. Bridging the digital divide

21. The Committee held a first round of discussions on the issue of bridging the digital divide — the second theme identified in the Secretary-General’s road map report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration for special attention in 2004 — focusing on assisting the Chief Executives Board (CEB) carry out an initial assessment of the outcome of the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). It will revert to the subject at its next session, with a view to preparing a fuller discussion by the Board on this overall theme at its fall 2004 session.
22. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) representative introduced a note on the subject (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.3) highlighting the changing character of the digital divide and recent trends with regard to countries’ access to information and communication technology services. He noted that a process of “catching up” is occurring in developing countries with respect to Internet access and the use of mobile phones. While the digital divide appears to be shrinking, the concern remains that it is not shrinking uniformly or fast enough throughout the world. New dimensions of the divide are emerging, i.e., broadband technologies and international Internet bandwidths tend to be in short supply in some regions of the world.

23. The ITU note also outlined the outcome of Phase 1 of the World Summit held in Geneva last December (the relevant part of the note is attached). In his brief on the subject, the ITU representative noted that the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action adopted at the Summit set out a strong case for the role of information and communication technologies in development, built around the assumption that their wider use will lead to the creation of an information society. In this regard, there is a direct link with the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. He further noted that the issue of the digital divide is a vital component of the encompassing themes of the information society, as dealt with by the Summit. The Declaration and Plan of Action call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish a working group on Internet governance and a task force on financing mechanisms to bridge the digital divide, to study and report on these issues.

24. With regard to the implications of the digital divide for the United Nations system, the ITU representative called for a reflection on the role of technology in the emerging information society and how the organizations of the United Nations system could make better use of information and communication technologies to fulfil their mandates and adjust their work methods in the new technological environment. At the programmatic level, each agency should review its mandate to determine whether and how its activities impact on the digital divide. Aspects of the digital divide touch on the mandates of practically all United Nations system organizations requiring a coordinated response on the part of the system. The High-level Summit Organizing Committee is expected to play a major coordinating role in this respect as well as in organizing the second phase of the Summit. As an initial step in preparing for the second phase of the Summit, he proposed that an inventory be prepared of current activities and programmes to bridge the digital divide, building upon relevant work under way in the Organizing Committee.

25. The representative of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat noted that, from the perspective of the United Nations, the first phase of the Summit had indeed been a success. The Summit had succeeded in shifting the focus from the technology to the use that is made of it to change people’s lives for the better. The link with human rights, freedom of expression, media freedom and access to information had been hotly debated but, in the end, clearly endorsed. The more practical results, in terms of the launch of innovative experiments and of announcements of partnerships had also been significant. A good example was the Global e-Schools and Community Initiative, which had been promoted by the United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force and launched at the Summit. The outcome document itself, with its 10 goals and 11 principles, provided a good structure for policy development as well as
operational work. The immediate challenges for the United Nations lie in the requests to the Secretary-General to set up a working group on Internet governance and a task force on financing mechanisms.

26. On Internet governance, the World Summit mandate speaks of an open, inclusive process with the full participation of governments, private sector and civil society, from both developed and developing countries. The United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force will be contributing to this process by holding a Global Forum in New York at the end of March, with participation of the different stakeholders and interest groups, to help identify the key issues related to Internet governance that may be pursued by the proposed working group. Broad consultations on both the governance and funding issues are currently under way. A concerted system-wide effort will be required to ensure that the second phase of the Summit, to be held in Tunis in 2005, carries effectively forward the progress made in Geneva.

27. The representative of the Department further noted that, beyond these events, the policy development challenges posed for the system by the information society are extremely wide-ranging. They include, in addition to Internet governance, e-commerce and e-finance across national boundaries, transactions in Internet-enabled services, frameworks and guidelines for operational activities on e-government, e-education, etc. issues relating to electronic media and freedom of the press, and cyber-security and privacy. The United Nations system needs to consider how best to provide the world community with coherent policy advice and support that can serve to advance integrated and mutually reinforcing responses to these challenges at both the global and national levels.

28. In the ensuing discussions, Committee members made the following observations:

– The main focus of future Board discussions on bridging the digital divide should go beyond technology and information technologies infrastructures and connectivity issues, and address how information and communication technologies are affecting societies and people’s lives; emphasis should be placed on human skills and capacity, along with e-readiness and content, as well as on building knowledge societies;

– The digital divide may be shrinking in some areas, but is widening in many others — between the North and the South as well as between rich and poor within countries; increasing exclusion of the poor should be addressed;

– The progress that several developing countries are making, and good practices on information and communication technology at the country level for example in relation to fighting HIV/AIDS, should be analysed and highlighted;

– While important work on information and communication technologies is ongoing in the Economic and Social Council, in the Information and Communication Technologies Task Force, in ITU as the lead organizing agency of the Summit, and in the other organizations of the United Nations system, greater coherence and coordination on information and communication technology within the United Nations system are essential, both to enhancing the overall effectiveness of the system and to strengthening its capacity to contribute to bridging the digital divide;
– In pursuing these issues from a programmatic perspective, the Committee should take into account and endeavour to complement the work under way in the High-level Committee on Management on the managerial dimensions of an information technologies strategy for the United Nations system, as requested by the General Assembly.

29. In the light of guidance from the forthcoming session of the Board, the Committee will make arrangements for the preparation of a substantive, action-oriented paper to assist CEB deliberations on the subject at the fall 2004 session of the Board. The High-level Summit Organizing Committee, which will meet on 1 April, will continue to play an important role in ensuring synergies within the system and contributing to the work of CEB on this issue.

II. Follow-up to the Chief Executives Board and the High-level Committee on Programmes decisions

A. Conflict prevention

30. The Chairman noted that the Committee had identified the issue of conflict prevention as a priority item in its work programme and recalled its previous discussions on the issue. He welcomed Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Turk of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the opportunity to exchange views with him on how best the Committee might advance its work on conflict prevention and on the Board’s contribution to the 2005 review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, particularly on the theme of peace and security.

31. The Assistant Secretary-General briefed the Committee on the salient provisions of General Assembly resolution 57/337 on the prevention of armed conflict, which called, inter alia, for a detailed review of the United Nations system’s capacity for conflict prevention; the identification of the proper framework for the elaboration of system-wide coherent and action-oriented strategies; rationalizing the funding procedures for the prevention of armed conflict; and proposals on enhancing the Secretariat support for strengthening United Nations cooperation with regional organizations. He drew attention to “operational prevention” initiatives, citing as examples United Nations preventive work in countries such as Ghana, Niger, Yemen, Cameroon and Nigeria. He also referred to extensive ongoing cooperation among United Nations system organizations at the field level to build a longer-term capacity for structural prevention. In reporting on conflict prevention to the General Assembly, the Department had been taking due account of views expressed by organizations of the system, including those of Committee members. He indicated that he fully shared the views expressed in the past in the Committee on the importance of regional and country-based approaches to conflict prevention; the importance of deepening the system’s understanding of the root causes of conflicts; avoiding “one-size-fits-all” approaches; and the need to further strengthen the analytical base for conflict prevention. The main common challenge was to find ways of putting these approaches into practice.

32. With regard to the comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict called for in General Assembly resolution 57/337, the Assistant Secretary-General referred to analyses under way on a geographically focused review of experiences in
conflict prevention; on processes to prevent the recurrence of conflict; and on the
definition of a comprehensive United Nations policy on conflict prevention. These
analyses will be drawn upon in preparing the report of the Secretary-General, with
the active involvement of the Interdepartmental Resource Group on conflict
prevention. He encouraged members of the Committee to participate in the work of
the Resource Group and to contribute inputs to the report. He hoped that these
inputs will be more substantive than had been the case in the past.

33. Turning to the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, the Assistant Secretary-General noted that the Panel had held only two
meetings so far — in December 2003 and in February 2004. After discussing
organizational matters at its initial meeting, the Panel was now in the process of
identifying and cataloguing various threats to international peace and security. It
was too early to anticipate the directions that the Panel’s work would take, including
the way in which it would approach institutional issues and the linkages of
development to security.

34. In the ensuing exchange of views, emphasis was placed on the importance of
furthering the system’s understanding not only of the root causes of conflicts but
also of the conditions and factors that sustain them. Members of the Committee
especially stressed the need to make better use of the system’s resources for early
warning and contingency planning. Examples cited of the system’s capacity for
detecting potential sources of conflicts included the United Nations Environment
Programme’s (UNEP) experience on the Aral Sea; food situation monitoring by the
World Food Programme (WFP); and drought monitoring by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO). The suggestion was made that the Department
should consider taking the lead to create a mechanism to systematically tap the
accumulated knowledge and experience of the system relevant to conflict
prevention.

35. Attention was drawn to the work of the Task Force on Transition from Crisis to
Development, which had reviewed cases where the United Nations had succeeded as
well as cases where it had been less successful in preventing conflict. The
conclusions of the Task Force confirmed that a one-size-fits-all approach does not
work and that each country situation requires an individual approach geared to its
particular circumstances. At the same time, considerable experience, from which
common lessons could be learned, was now available. In this context, guidelines for
integrating conflict prevention approaches had been drawn up for consideration by
the Resident Coordinator System.

36. It was generally felt that steady progress was being made in bringing the
organizations of the system together on conflict prevention. Increasingly, the system
was adopting multidimensional, country-based approaches to conflict prevention
and post-conflict reconstruction, based on comprehensive assessments of a country’s
particular circumstances and needs. Reference was made to the case of Liberia,
where a single mechanism was in place to integrate inputs from all relevant parties,
including from the private sector.

37. In this context and with a view to sustaining conflict prevention efforts, it was
important that mechanisms to monitor and verify disarmament measures should be
strengthened and extended to small arms.
38. Criminal groups, warlords, arms and drug trafficking, as well as corruption, contribute to conflicts. A concerted and coordinated response by the system is required to address these sources of conflict.

39. The Committee expressed appreciation for the opportunity to exchange views with the Department on how best it might advance its work on the issue of conflict prevention. It confirmed its previous decision to keep the issue of conflict prevention as a priority item on its agenda and agreed to bring the issue to the Board, possibly at its first session in 2005, with concrete recommendations. The Secretary of the Chief Executives Board will consult with the Department to identify the issues on which the Committee and the Board could most profitably focus.

40. The Committee also concurred with the proposal that the system’s contribution to the 2005 review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration on the theme of peace and security be taken forward by the Department in the context of ongoing work of the Interdepartmental Resource Group on conflict prevention.

B. 2005 comprehensive review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration

41. The Committee reviewed progress in the preparation of the system’s contribution to the 2005 review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration on the basis of a note prepared by the High-level Committee on Programmes Task Group (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.4).

42. The Convenor of the Committee’s Task Group informed the Committee of ongoing work in the subgroups on development and protection of the environment and on human rights, democracy and governance, as well as about the outcome of the videoconference held on 16 January 2004. (Arrangements to carry forward work on the theme “peace and security” are dealt with in para. 40 above.) She reiterated that this work is intended to focus on the United Nations system’s own contribution to the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. As an accountability report by the system, the report will place emphasis on joint initiatives and activities of the system to support the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. Examples of such joint activities are shown in the appendix of the Task Group’s note.

43. The International Labour Organization (ILO), as lead agency on human rights, democracy and governance, presented an outline of the main points to be covered in this section of the report, highlighting cross-cutting themes, and progress achieved through human rights instruments and mechanisms. Committee members were requested to provide additional inputs to the work of the subgroup, particularly in the area of democracy and governance.

44. The representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, as lead agencies on development and protection of the environment, introduced an outline of the main elements to be covered in this section of the report: how the system has responded to the challenge of helping implement relevant provisions of the Declaration; the obstacles encountered in its implementation; the way forward for the system; synergies between the Millennium Development Goals and other goals or sections of the Millennium Declaration; and policy recommendations. The need to better integrate issues and activities relating to protection of the environment into the outline was stressed.
45. The following observations and suggestions were made in the course of the discussion:

– Ongoing discussions of multilateralism should provide the context of all chapters of the report;

– The link between this work and preparations for the 2005 high-level event should be clarified;

– A clear distinction should be drawn between the primary responsibility of Member States and the supporting role of the system; emphasis should be placed on country ownership and on how the system has helped Member States achieve progress in implementing the Millennium Declaration;

– The focus should be on concrete results obtained, particularly at the country level, and on how the system has contributed to their achievement; to this end, relevant initiatives undertaken in follow-up to conferences and summits that initially set development goals, country reports on the Millennium Development Goals and the outcomes of the Millennium Project should be systematically drawn upon;

– Progress in the follow-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, as well as developments relating to global warming, biodiversity and genetically modified organisms, should be addressed in the report, as should progress achieved in relation to the goals and targets on education;

– While catalogues of individual agency activities should be avoided, the report should go beyond what are formally regarded as joint activities and provide an overall picture of major United Nations system activities that, taken together, have contributed in a significant way to implementing the Millennium Declaration;

– Recommendations should examine what policies have worked and why in advancing the implementation of the Declaration.

46. The Vice-Chairman suggested that the report, after outlining the context based on the Committee’s current discussions on multilateralism, should contribute an assessment of both progress and challenges, focussing on what is actually happening on the ground in relation to peace and security (human security), development and protection of the environment, as well as human rights, democracy and governance, and conclude by defining some imperatives for the further work of both Member States and United Nations system organizations.

47. The Committee expressed appreciation for the work of the Task Group and requested it to submit a first draft of its report to the eighth session of the Committee.

C. Financing for development

48. The Committee addressed the follow-up to the Chief Executives Board (CEB) discussions on financing for development on the basis of an analytical note on resource flows to developing countries (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5) and a scoping note on special funds (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5/Add.1) prepared by the Financing for Development Office of the Department of Economic and Social
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. It was recalled that the Committee, at its intersessional meeting on 3 November 2003, had requested the Financing for Development Office to prepare a concise, data-based state-of-play analysis, focusing on developments concerning resource flows, to enable Executive Heads to maintain an overview of developments in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus based on common data, and to speak authoritatively on what is being delivered compared to commitments made at Monterrey. The Committee had also expressed concern over the proliferation of special funds being established both within and outside the United Nations system, and had requested the Financing for Development Office to prepare, in cooperation with interested agencies, a scoping note on such funds, to enable the Committee to initiate an analysis of current trends and their implications for the system and for resource flows for development.

49. In introducing the analytical note (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5), the representative of the Financing for Development Office recalled that the General Assembly High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development held in October 2003 had taken stock of progress in the implementation of agreements and commitments made at Monterrey and identified some of the critical areas where greater efforts were required. Its main conclusion was that political will and how to muster that will were key to delivering the Monterrey Consensus. The representative of the Financing for Development Office drew attention to trends and developments in international trade, financial flows to developing countries, net transfer of financial resources, official development assistance and debt relief as outlined in the analytical note. The international community needed both to exert greater effort to mobilize additional financial resources for development and to increase the effectiveness of their use. On the part of the United Nations system, its contribution to the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus should continue to focus on enhancing advocacy and advancing system-wide coherence, coordination and cooperation, particularly by strengthening collective approaches to policy advice and programme delivery at all levels.

50. Turning to the scoping note (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5/Add.1), the representative of the Financing for Development Office indicated that the intent was to provide basic information and identify issues for initiating an analysis of the role of special funds and their relationship to United Nations development work. The special funds covered by the note included the International Development Association (IDA); European Development Fund (EDF); the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Global Environment Facility; Millennium Challenge Account; the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization; and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition. The issues raised in the note related to advocacy, resource additionality, duplication of capacities and process improvement. The paper concluded with a suggestion for the Committee to continue its work on the impact of special funds on mobilizing financial resources for development, in particular the Millennium Development Goals, based on a number of preliminary messages to be derived from the current discussion.

51. In the ensuing exchange of views, the importance was highlighted of a balanced assessment of progress made by both donor and developing countries in implementing the Monterrey Consensus. In this context, the view was expressed that the focus should not only be on resource flows to developing countries but also on progress made by developing countries in creating an enabling environment for their own development. It was pointed out, at the same time, that the main thrust of the
mandate for the analytical note was not on the overall monitoring of the implementation of the commitments made at Monterrey, which will be dealt with comprehensively in the Secretary-General’s report to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, but on following up on a particular aspect of the discussions at the Board by providing the Committee a basis for considering how best to provide Executive Heads with a common, authoritative set of data on which to focus their advocacy effort for the delivery of the funding commitments made at Monterrey.

52. A number of suggestions were made on the analytical and data material that would best serve these purposes. These included a suggestion that the analysis of resource flows should cover debt relief, not only ODA, as a means of meeting the Barcelona commitments; and a suggestion to include in the analysis remittances and ODA from countries not members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

53. With regard to special funds, suggestions made by the Committee on how to carry forward the exercise included the following:

- While a main purpose guiding the exercise should be to build a strong United Nations in the international architecture and to identify the resources it needs to fulfil its mandate, care should be exercised to avoid the impression that the United Nations system is solely concerned about its own funding, rather than the ultimate overall objective of development financing. Funding for the United Nations system should be analysed in relation to the overall picture: what funds are available at the country level and how donors are meeting their commitments for development support;

- The analysis of special funds should focus on their impact on additionality of resources; it should consider the implications for country ownership and for United Nations system coordination at the field level, on the one hand, and for policy coherence at the international level, on the other; and it should address concerns about duplication of administrative capacities;

- The analysis should also address the changing structure and patterns of funding for the United Nations system’s development activities and the reasons why money is flowing to special funds; and give attention to private financing of multilateral activities.

54. The Committee decided to continue its consideration of the follow-up to the Board’s discussion on financing for development and requested the Financing for Development Office, in consultation with concerned organizations, to revise and update the notes (CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5 and CEB/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.5/Add.1) in the light of discussions at its current session, for consideration at its eighth session. It further concluded that IDA and EDF should not be treated as special funds.

D. HIV/AIDS and its linkages with food security and governance

55. The representatives of the secretariat of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and of the World Food Programme (WFP) reported on the implementation of actions and recommendations on the triple threat of HIV/AIDS, food security and governance, which the Board had endorsed at its fall 2003 session. The UNAIDS secretariat also circulated a letter from the
Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as Chairman of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), to the Regional Coordinator and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa, the WFP Regional Director and the Regional Team Leader of UNAIDS Inter-Country Team, in Eastern and Southern Africa. Copies of the letter were also sent to the United Nations Resident Coordinators in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, along with the conclusions of the Board.

56. UNDG has requested the Regional Directors Group to follow up on the Board’s decisions. Each Director will appoint a focal point for this initiative to work closely with the UNAIDS Secretariat and WFP. UNDG also requested that the issue be discussed at the UNAIDS Committee of Co-Sponsoring Organizations meeting in Zambia on 4 March 2004, instead of at the UNDG Executive Committee, as a wider group of UNDG members would be at that meeting and more time would be available to discuss the issue at length. At that meeting, the Committee of Co-Sponsoring Organizations would be requested to consider and endorse the following critical steps:

– UNDG instructions to United Nations Country Teams;

– Assess United Nations Country Team capacities to implement the report’s recommendations. The joint missions will review the recommendations and decisions of the Chief Executives Board (CEB) with each of the United Nations Country Teams and make joint recommendations on how best to support the United Nations Country Teams;

– Mobilize resources to meet capacity gaps (of the United Nations and national partners);

– Develop an accelerated United Nations reform pilot proposal; and

– Organize a Regional Directors’ meeting in mid-2004 to report on progress.

57. The Committee took note of the report of the UNAIDS Secretariat and WFP and requested them to follow up with the Southern Africa Regional Directors Group on progress and report to the High-level Committee at its eighth session.

E. Follow-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development

58. The Vice-Chairman briefed the Committee on the outcome of his consultations with Committee members at an informal brainstorming meeting on 3 February, followed by a videoconference on 17 February, dealing with an appropriate inter-agency collaborative arrangement for the follow-up to energy-related decisions at the Summit. A note setting out elements for inter-agency collaboration on energy (CRP/2004/HLCP-VII/CRP.6) had been drawn up on the basis of those consultations and was before the Committee for its consideration. The note recommends that the Committee agree to set up a system-wide collaborative mechanism on energy, on the lines of UN-Water and UN-Oceans and chaired on a rotational basis, and to request an open-ended task force, led by a senior official and consisting of experts on energy, to elaborate its draft terms of reference, work programme, methods of work and modalities for interaction with outside actors.
59. The Director of the secretariat of the Chief Executives Board (CEB) informed the Committee that the Oceans and Coastal Areas Network, renamed “UN-Oceans”, has completed work on its terms of reference, modalities of work and membership, which includes secretariats of United Nations and related conventions on climate change, wetlands and biological diversity, the International Seabed Authority, OECD, as well as the International Hydrographic Organization. Following the decision of the Committee confirming UN-Water as the inter-agency mechanism for the follow-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development on water and sanitation, consultations were held among its members. UN-Water is in the process of drafting its terms of reference, modalities of work and a future programme of work, particularly in view of the establishment by the Secretary-General of the Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. The Director of the CEB secretariat also informed the Committee that a Secretary-General’s report on inter-agency cooperation and coordination in the follow-up to the World Summit is being presented to the 12th session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (14-30 April 2004) outlining the decisions taken and work under way within the framework of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board (CEB) on enhancing inter-agency cooperation and coordination on the follow-up to the World Summit, focusing on collaborative arrangements relating to freshwater, water and sanitation, energy, oceans and coastal areas, and changing unsustainable production and consumption patterns.

60. Views put forward in the course of the discussion were as follows:

– While the High-level Committee on Programmes may offer its views on different aspects of the arrangements that inter-agency mechanisms are putting in place, the new approaches to coordination suggest that the Committee’s focus should be on providing broad policy advice and on ensuring mutual reinforcement among these mechanisms;

– The progress achieved by UN-Oceans in drawing up its terms of reference, functioning modalities, work programme, and membership was generally welcomed;

– On water, concern was expressed over the elaborate structures that UN-Water was considering; emphasis was placed on the need for simplified, flexible arrangements, in line with the new approaches to coordination adopted by CEB;

– On energy, as with wider inter-agency cooperation, emphasis was placed on improving United Nations system support to countries and communities to enable them to manage better the sustainable development challenges facing them. Results-based and strategic planning approaches should help to guide the system in identifying and delivering such support, as well as orienting the form and function of any collaborative mechanism;

– Collaborative approaches on energy should include nuclear power;

– The structure and secretariat support of any inter-agency collaborative arrangement on energy should be light and should draw on existing capacities within the United Nations system.

61. In reply to a question as to whether the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, as part of its responsibilities for supporting system-wide follow-up to the World Summit and the related work of the Commission on Sustainable Development, would provide secretariat support for the inter-agency collaborative
arrangement on energy, the representative of the Department confirmed this understanding, and indicated that, in providing a focal point for this purpose, the Department would act in a collaborative, inclusive way and would draw fully on existing capacities within the United Nations system. The Committee noted these indications. Some members stated that they would give consideration to appropriate forms of supporting the Department in this regard.

62. The Committee decided to establish an ad hoc task force composed of United Nations system experts on energy and led by the Vice-Chairman of the Committee to elaborate terms of reference and work programme for a system-wide collaborative arrangement on energy in the light of discussions in the Committee at its current session, for review by the Committee at its next intersessional meeting. It was suggested that the Vice-Chairman initiate consultations with all concerned organizations on the selection of the policy-level official to chair the collaborative arrangement on energy recommended by the ad hoc task force, bearing in mind the principle of rotation.

F. Chief Executives Board communication strategy

63. The Vice-Chairman recalled the background of the Committee’s discussions on a communication strategy for the Chief Executives Board (CEB), noting that the initiative arose from a widely perceived need to give greater attention to communicating the collective views of Executive Heads and projecting the United Nations system to the outside world with clear and coherent CEB-driven messages. He drew attention to the three options set out in a note on the subject, which the Committee had considered at its previous session in 2003: a zero approach, where the focus is strictly on communication within the United Nations system; an opportunity-driven approach, in which the Board decides to make statements to influence events as they arise; and a collective leadership approach, in which the Board endeavours to project itself as the collective leadership of the global multilateral system. He recalled that the initial reaction in the Committee had been that, without prejudice to the desirability of working towards the collective leadership option, a realistic approach would be to focus, in the first instance, on the management of CEB statements and to give attention at the same time to strengthening internal communication, fostering better liaison between the communications departments of the system and improving the CEB web site. He informed the Committee that he had consulted with the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Public Information (DPI) of the United Nations Secretariat on a coordinated approach to a CEB communication strategy and that he had been invited to the June meeting of the United Nations Communications Group (UNCG) in Nairobi to discuss how best to advance such a coordinated approach.

64. Committee members reaffirmed the importance of projecting CEB as the embodiment of the United Nations system and capitalizing on the opportunity presented by the gathering of its top executives to deliver a common message. They welcomed the Vice-Chairman’s consultations with the Department and the Group to ensure a coordinated approach and agreed to bring the issue to the Board at its fall 2004 session in the context of the follow-up to the Board’s conclusions on multilateralism.
III. Other matters

A. New Partnership for Africa’s Development

65. The representative of the Regional Commissions (New York Office) of the United Nations Secretariat informed the Committee that as reported to its sixth session, the Annual Regional Consultations Meeting of the United Nations System in support of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was scheduled to be held in late 2003 under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary-General. The meeting was to take stock of how well the United Nations system was responding collectively to the priorities identified for the implementation of NEPAD. The meeting had to be rescheduled and will now be held in May 2004.

66. Since the last progress report submitted to the Committee, important activities in support of NEPAD at the regional and subregional levels continued to take place. In addition, and as agreed by the Fifth Regional Consultations Meeting, a new cluster on science and technology is being established under the leadership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The agencies involved have been working closely with the NEPAD secretariat, which is represented at the Regional Consultations Meeting, as well as with other regional organizations. Activities in this area have included support to the First NEPAD Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 3-7 November 2003, as well as providing assistance to African countries in the development of terms of reference and identification of experts in the area. The group has also been actively working on the problem of brain drain in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration and the NEPAD secretariat.

67. The water and sanitation sub-cluster of the infrastructure development cluster organized a Pan-African Implementation and Partnership Conference on Water in Addis Ababa from 8 to 13 December 2003. The issues addressed included the role of Africa’s water resources in the development of the continent, the concept of integrated water resource management and the financing of water sector development in Africa. Future activities planned by the sub-cluster include: (a) establishing during 2004 national task forces on water to prepare and implement plans for achieving the Millennium Development Goals targets by 2015; (b) negotiating the implementation of portfolio projects with development cooperation partners, Bretton Woods institutions and the UN-Water/Africa which brings together all United Nations agencies working in the continent; and (c) presenting in an integrated manner the commitment and recommendations for developing Africa’s common position and approach before and after the twelfth session of the Commission on Sustainable Development.

68. The transport sub-cluster continues to assist in the implementation of the sub-Saharan African transport policy programmes within the context of NEPAD. In addition, activities related to air transport liberalization are being pursued in many countries and assessment reports are being prepared for West and Central Africa.

69. The information and communication technologies sub-cluster met in September 2003 to discuss the involvement of the United Nations agencies in the implementation of the Short-Term Action Plan on Infrastructure Development. The
sub-cluster also organized several forums in preparation for the World Summit on the Information Society in December 2003 in Geneva.

70. The governance, peace and security cluster collaborated in organizing stakeholder workshops of parliamentarians, Ministers and representatives of civil society from the 16 countries involved in the preparation of the African Peer Review.

71. In spite of the progress made, much remains to be done to enhance the coherence and coordination of United Nations system support of NEPAD. For example, the thematic clusters identified several areas where synergies could be strengthened in their various work programmes. Moreover, cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, gender and human rights also need to be mainstreamed into all the clusters’ activities. In addition, there is general agreement on the need for the United Nations system to assist in strengthening the capacities of the regional economic communities, the African Union Commission and the NEPAD secretariat. However, resources available for doing this remain inadequate. Finally, the regional consultations mechanism itself needs to further clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies operating at the regional and subregional levels in Africa in order to avoid duplication and ensure greater complementarity of efforts.

72. The Committee took note of the progress report on NEPAD and expressed appreciation for the briefing provided by the Regional Commissions (New York Office).

B. Preparations for the coordination segment of the 2004 session of the Economic and Social Council

73. The Committee agreed on the importance of system-wide collaboration in ensuring effective support for the Economic and Social Council. It noted efforts under way, including through inter-agency panels organized in conjunction with meetings of the coordination segment, to highlight the contribution of the Chief Executives Board system to enhanced policy and programme coherence within the United Nations system.

C. High-level Committee on Programmes work programme: 2004-2005

74. Members of the High-level Committee on Programmes agreed that the revised work programme for 2004-2005 should continue to give attention to strengthening coordination and mutual reinforcement between the Committee and the United Nations Development Group. Issues relating to the harmonization/unification of country programming frameworks were among the priority concerns that could best be pursued in this context. The follow-up to Board decisions should also receive high priority in the Committee’s work programme. The Committee decided to revise its work programme for 2004-2005 in the light of its discussions at the current session, as indicated in the attachment to the present report (Attachment 3).
D. Date and venue of eighth session of the High-level Committee on Programmes

75. The Committee decided to hold an intersessional meeting on Monday, 31 May and Tuesday, 1 June at a venue in Europe. It further decided, at the invitation of the United Nations Children’s Fund, to hold its eighth regular session on Thursday, 16 September and Friday, 17 September 2004 in Florence, Italy.

E. Briefing by the Chairman of the High-level Committee on Management

76. The Chairman of the High-level Committee on Management (HLCM) briefed the Committee on the work of his Committee. This included issues relating to staff security and safety — preparations for the 2004 census of staff, headquarters security and safety, work of the Accountability Panel on Security in Iraq, United Nations humanitarian air-service liability issues; impact on management and programme of the changing relationship between regular and voluntary funding; finance and budget issues — United Nations System Accounting Standards, support costs; measures to improve system-wide mobility, including recognition of domestic partners and measures to assist in spouse employment; human resources issues — reform of the pay system, introduction of the senior management service, equitable geographic representation; and information and communication technologies issues — United Nations system search engine, United Nations system Extranet Project, information security, procurement issues; and the Board’s dialogue with the Chairman of the International Civil Service Commission and staff representatives.

77. The Committee welcomed the briefing by the Chairman of the High-level Committee on Management and the opportunity to engage in a dialogue on issues of common interest to both committees. The suggestion was made for the High-level Committee on Programmes to discuss the issue of information and communication technologies for more effective programme delivery building on the outcome of discussions at the High-level Committee on Management.

F. Spring 2004 session of the Chief Executives Board

78. The representative of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme briefed members of the Committee on logistical arrangements for the spring 2004 session of the Board in Vienna.

G. Earth observation

79. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) representative informed the Committee that a ministerial-level process instituted by over 30 Governments and involving several organizations of the United Nations system was reviewing the existing earth observing system with the aim of promoting the development of a comprehensive, coordinated and sustained Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). An Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO) is developing a framework document to describe GEOSS and an associated
10-year implementation, building on existing systems and initiatives within the
color of existing mandates of international organizations.

Notes

1 These include: (1) High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (United Nations); (2) Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (United Nations); (3) Commission on Human Security; (4) World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (ILO); (5) Commission on the Private Sector and Development (UNDP); (6) Global Programmes Evaluation (World Bank); (7) International Task Force on Global Public Goods; (8) Global Commission on International Migration; and (9) Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy.
ATTACHMENTS

Report of the High-Level Committee on Programmes at its Seventh Session, Beirut, 26-27 February 2004

1. Agenda
2. List of Participants
3. Curbing Transnational Crime
   - Note by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on “Organized crime and corruption are threats to security and development – The role of the United Nations”
4. The World Summit on Information Society and Bridging the Digital Divide
   - Note prepared by ITU
5. WSSD follow-up – Elements for a system-wide collaborative arrangements in the field of energy
Attachment 1

Agenda

1. Preparations for CEB Spring 2004 session
   (a) Multilateralism
   (b) Curbing transnational crime
   (c) Bridging the digital divide

2. Follow up to CEB and HLCP decisions
   (a) Conflict prevention
   (b) 2005 comprehensive review of the implementation of the Millennium Declaration
   (c) Financing for development
   (d) HIV/AIDS and its linkages with food security and governance
   (e) WSSD follow up
   (f) CEB communication strategy

3. Other matters
   (a) NEPAD
   (b) HLCP work programme
   (c) Date and venue of 8th session of HLCP
Attachment 2

List of Participants

Chairman: Lennart Båge (IFAD)
Vice-Chairman: Mats Karlsson (World Bank)

United Nations
Danilo Türk
Patrizio Civili
John Clark
Alex Trepelkov
Kathleen Abdalla

Regional Commissions New York Office
Sulafa Al-Bassam

International Labour Organization
Don Skerrett
Lee Swepston
Christopher Perrin

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Wendy Mann

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Hans D’Orville
Jean-Yves Le Saux

International Civil Aviation Organization
Lise Boisvert

World Health Organization
Peter Mertens

World Bank
Mats Karlsson
Eduardo Doryan

International Monetary Fund
Reinhard Munzberg

Universal Postal Union
James Gunderson

International Telecommunication Union
Arthur Levin

World Meteorological Organization
Soobasschandra Chacowry

World Intellectual Property Organization
Orobola Fasehun

International Fund for Agricultural Development
Lennart Båge
Uday Abhyankar

United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Andrei Lazykin

International Atomic and Energy Agency
Ramachandran Swaminathan

World Trade Organization
Patrick John Rata

World Tourism Organization
Peter Shackleford

* *** *
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
United Nations Development Programme  
United Nations Environment Programme  
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East  
United Nations Children’s Fund  
United Nations Population Fund  
World Food Programme  
United Nations International Drug Control Programme  
UN-HABITAT/United Nations Human Settlements Programme  
CTBTO  
Joint and Co-sponsored United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS  
CEB Secretariat  

Dan Deac  
Bruce Jenks  
Mourad Wahba  
Adnan Amin  
Marjon Kamara  
Martin Loftus  
Rene Aquarone  
Ado Vaher  
Mari Simonen  
Allan Jury  
Sumru Noyan  
Nasra Hassan  
Mark Shaw  
Daniel Biau  
Bernard Wrabetz  
Werasit Sittitrai  
Qazi Shaukat Fareed  
Agerico Lacanlale  
Phyllis Lee
Attachment 3

Curbing Transnational Crime

Note by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on
“Organized crime and corruption are threats to security and development - The role of the United Nations”

PREFACE

Countering organized crime, as well as the related problems of drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism, is intimately associated with development and achieving sustainable livelihoods.

This paper provides evidence that action against the anti-social behaviours that rest at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is an essential component of the achievement of the UN goals. In the current global context, the linkage between insecurity and lack of development must be taken seriously by the UN system if a truly holistic response to the suffering and socio-economic distortions caused by crime and related problems of insecurity is to be built. Therefore, and this is the conclusion of the paper, at a time when (in the words of the Secretary General) the “hard threats” to humanity are ever more pressing, CEB members may wish to focus on how the UN system as a whole helps to contain these threats.

Today crime causes enormous individual suffering. Violence distorts social systems and undermines legitimate commercial activity. In some countries crime is a major cause of death among the young, undermining the development and ambitions of the next generation. Corruption is especially subtle and pernicious, at times bankrupting nations: with national wealth pillaged, services are curtailed at the expense especially of the poor. Drug traffickers launder their proceeds into the legitimate system, fund terrorism and promote mal-governance. They thrive on the drug addiction of others, destroying the lives of millions of people and spreading disease, especially HIV/AIDS. Even more appalling is the trafficking of humans, a modern form of slavery and bondage.

These phenomena are not new, but their magnitude and consequences are unprecedented in the current age, both the cause and consequence of changes in the way societies function and interact. First, weak governments, social malaise, corrupted private and public practices and conflict, have become a weapon and shield for criminals, traffickers and terrorists. Second, crime and corruption have taken advantage of the internationalization of economic activity, market deregulation, hi-tech communications and rapid systems of transportation. Third, as a
consequence of the above, criminal activities have developed with remarkable speed in the last
decade, in new areas and with greater ease. Crime has become multinational and organized, with
its own tariffs, terms of trade, management structures, financial arrangements and means of
enforcement.

The contrast between the wealth (although only for a few) created by organized crime
and the misery spawned by it are startling. Indeed, the painful consequences of organized crime
are felt mostly in poor suburbs and shantytowns where drug injection, prostitution and abuse
spread HIV/AIDS. The activities of criminal groups perpetuate humanitarian crises in post-
conflict situations, particularly (and ironically) where natural resources are plentiful. They attract
the young without any options for employment. They frustrate development assistance,
magnifying its need and weakening its impact.

Given the complexity of crime (used here as the archetype of all anti-social behaviours)
and the severity of its consequences, a global consensus is needed on the ways and means to
control it. Political agreement on countering these threats was strongly manifested in the
Millennium Declaration. Security cannot be guaranteed, development cannot be sustained, and
justice cannot reign if a country’s economy is based on opium or coca cultivation; if guns, rather
than ballots, elect leaders; if foreign trade is contaminated by illicit goods; if the banking sector
is undermined by corrupt practices; if public policy pursues private interests; if international
finance is tainted by money laundering.

Important progress has recently been made in countering crime and corruption. The
strength of multi-lateralism lies in the adoption and compliance with international norms. The
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and with its three Protocols against
trafficking of humans, smuggling of migrants, and the trafficking in small arms, which recently
entered into force, is a prime example Another historical benchmark was reached last November
when the General Assembly adopted the first comprehensive Convention against Corruption.
Society now faces the task of putting these norms into practice. Here is where all United Nations
organizations can play a role.

By definition, programmes aimed at countering social evils are multi-sector: given the
spread and depth of these challenges there is work for everyone, building on individual
comparative advantage and institutional expertise. In this paper several specific actions are
suggested to launch the process across the UN system. Agencies are encouraged to participate
where they see relevance to their mandates and implications for their work.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION BY CEB</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The context</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Organized crime and corruption as multinational undertakings</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Organized crime and corruption as global threats</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. IMPACT ON ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Peace and security</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Development</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Human rights, democracy and governance</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Organized crime, and the associated problem of corruption, is evolving rapidly and now constitutes one of the key security challenges facing the global community. The activities of organized criminal networks are expanding beyond traditional sectors such as illicit narcotics. Already organized crime groups are heavily involved in the trafficking of human beings and there are indications of a growing trend towards sophisticated fraud in the financial and other sectors. In turn, new and recent trends, including the expansion of the number of weak states and the presence of zones of conflict and instability, are having a dramatic impact on the nature and development of organized crime. Given this, the activities of organized criminal groups have a profound influence on three sectors of direct concern to the work of the United Nations and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Peace and security

2. Ongoing conflicts as well as civil and political instability are closely linked to the formation and growth of criminal networks. War not only generates instability, in which organized criminal activities thrive, but provides opportunity for illicit enrichment, through the creation of profitable new markets for smuggled goods, such as natural resources and weapons.

3. Organized criminal groups established in periods of conflict delay, even subvert, the establishment of democratic institutions in the post-conflict phase. In most post-conflict situations, the growth of organized crime constitutes a challenge to the development of reformed national institutions, such as police, customs and the judiciary, as well as to economic reforms.

4. Critically, terrorists must be prevented from making use of transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money laundering and illicit arms trafficking. The connections between organized crime and terrorist groups are emerging as a new threat in the current global context.

5. The links between organized crime, conflict, and increasingly, terrorism have, and will continue to, put peacekeeping operations at risk.

Development

6. Extensive presence of organized crime undermines legitimate economic activity. Legal practices are undermined by unrelated elements of risk and investments and business decisions are distorted. Criminal organizations often operate through ‘front companies’, blurring licit and illicit business and by supplementing legal profits with illegal ones, thereby eliminating honest competitors.

7. In developing economies, the activities of organized criminal groups impact directly upon the poor, who have few savings or resources to absorb the costs. Criminal organizations have also had
profound impacts on communities through the fostering of local criminal economies that subvert established systems of local governance.

8. The increased involvement of organized criminal groups, many based in developing countries, in economic and financial crimes, such as credit and debit card fraud, fraud on the internet and electronic counterfeiting, exemplifies the economic reach as well as the innovative uses of modern technology.

9. In prominent cases of substantial fraud in the banking system during the last decade the implications were truly global; investors across the world being affected with the most severe damage done to the banking systems of a number of developing countries. Such illicit activities may rival trafficking in illicit drugs as a source of criminal profits and at the same time impact negatively on the international financial system.

**Human rights, democracy and governance**

10. Organized crime groups directly undermine human rights, subjecting individuals and communities to high levels of violence, fear and increased susceptibility to disease. Most vulnerable are those groups, the poor, the elderly, women and children, who for social and economic reasons have fewer alternatives, or are victims of threats and deception.

11. Organized criminal groups trigger and fuel HIV/AIDS epidemics among injecting drug users, in prisons and in the sex industry. The position has reached critical proportions in some parts of the world where well over 70% of HIV/AIDS cases are related to injecting drug use. The rapid increase in drug abuse in these countries was in large part a result of organized crime groups seeking to create expanded markets for illicit narcotics.

12. The transport of human beings and their sale for sexual exploitation and profit by other human beings remains one of the most egregious violations of human rights. Violations of the reproductive rights of women and adolescents as a result of trafficking have numerous manifestations including rape, forced or unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. In particular, the exploitation of children either for forced labour or purposes of sexual exploitation, including child pornography, have traumatic consequences for young people, undercutting their chances of living normal and productive lives.

13. Apart from undercutting human rights, organized criminal groups actively work to subvert democratic process, including through influencing judicial systems and the outcome of elections and the ‘buying off’ of elected officials. Transparent and well-functioning judicial systems (including law enforcement, prosecutors and judges) are crucial to limiting the power and influence of organized crime.
Building an effective response

14. The global nature of today’s organized crime requires a global response, relying first and foremost on increased international cooperation. The global instrument to combat organized crime is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime that came into force in September 2003. Supplementing the Convention are three protocols targeting specific manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants, and the Protocol on Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. Also in 2003, the UN Convention against Corruption was adopted and has since been signed by 104 countries and ratified by one. It will come into effect after 30 countries ratify it.

15. These instruments provide an important foundation on which a broader response to organized crime can be developed by the United Nations. What is required is a strategic response to the threat posed by organized crime by the agencies of the United Nations system. The paper identifies twelve areas of action for the UN – outlined in the highlighted sections in the body of the paper. A number of specific proposals for action by CEB are considered at the outset.

ACTION BY CEB

16. The issues outlined in this note highlight the urgent need to curb organized crime, with a particular focus required on building a comprehensive response and intensifying efforts at international cooperation. In particular, the paper identifies a series of specific actions that must be taken by the UN system. To kick-start the process, the following immediate interventions are proposed:

(a) A review by the relevant agencies of the implications of the links between ongoing conflicts and organized crime, taking into consideration the specific areas for action identified in the Note.

(b) Actions identified in respect of collaborative interventions to counter the trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants, including responding to the vulnerability of trafficking victims to HIV/AIDS, be taken up by the Geneva Migration Group as appropriate to its mandate.

(c) Promotion of multi-agency assessments to determine the extent of involvement of organized criminal activity in the trafficking of the following illicit commodities: small arms and light weapons in conflict zones; nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as biological- and chemical-weapon relevant materials; endangered species, ozone depleting substances and other commodities outlawed under Multilateral Environmental Agreements; and cultural property.

(d) An urgent assessment to be conducted of the extent of HIV/AIDS in prisons.
17. In the short to medium term, a series of broader interventions across the UN system will be essential in retaining a focus on the issues outlined in the paper. Having regard to these factors, the CEB may wish to recommend that:

(a) The agencies of the UN system, with due regard to their mandates, promote the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the signing and entry into force of the United Nations Convention against Corruption as well as the signing and ratification of other Conventions addressing organized criminal activities in various fields.

(b) The agreement of the Conference of the Parties of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime be sought for the development of a UN system-wide strategic response to organized crime. Issues that could be built into this strategic response include: mechanisms in which UN agencies and other organizations can help motivate States to ratify the Convention and its Protocols, as well as the Convention against Corruption; and, encouraging the Conference of the Parties to develop a multi-year action plan for implementation, including a programme for technical cooperation.

(c) Competent organizations outside of the UN system be invited to contribute to a further examination of the issues outlined in this Note.

(d) A cross-agency system for sharing best practices in countering organized crime be developed, with a particular focus on preventive mechanisms, including in the important area of education and awareness raising.

(e) UNDG be requested to consider, as part of its annual work programme, the inclusion of issues of organized crime and corruption in programme planning mechanisms, including in the CCA and UNDAF.

(f) Relevant agencies of the UN system contribute to the next session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to be held in Vienna in May 2004 given that the theme of the meeting, ‘The Rule of Law and Development’, encompasses many of the critical issues outlined in the Note.

(g) Further discussion and analysis of these issues be encouraged at the 11th Crime Congress to be held in Bangkok in April 2005 and that, given the importance and urgency of responding to these matters, agencies of the UN system actively participate in the discussions at the Congress.

(h) The organizations of the UN system be invited to pursue actively and in a collaborative way the programmatic activities set out in this Note.
I. The context

18. The Millennium Declaration stresses the right to live in dignity, free from violence and oppression. Good governance and the rule of law are deemed necessary to promote sustainable development.

19. The Secretary-General has spoken of “hard” and “soft” threats to contemporary societies, both equally pernicious to development and, therefore, to the attainment of the Millennium Goals. Crime is more than just a synonym of hard underworld violence, relevant only to law enforcement agencies. Equally pernicious are the soft under-belly dimensions of illegality, from corruption to corporate offences, from cyber-crime to money laundering. Public wealth, of state treasuries and public companies alike, is stolen and expatriated. Shareholders have their rights, and revenues, denied. The internet spreads illegal activities through a web that overcomes barriers of time and space, creating a seamless illicit market whose omni-presence is, ironically, hard to detect. Advantage is taken of massive poverty and the vulnerability of human beings, especially women and children, trapped and smuggled as “merchandise” for exploitation in distant lands. And, through the corruption of the very same institutions that are necessary for sustainable development, the condition of misery is rendered ever more permanent.

20. Given the scale, and the spread, of these problems Member States have committed themselves to make the United Nations a more effective instrument in the fight against illicit drugs, violence, terror and crime and to intensify their efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions. Measures against trafficking, as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering have become even more necessary and urgent.

21. While petty criminal activity undermines individual security by reducing people’s life chances, when such activity is organized and sophisticated it has a profound impact on societies’ socio-political development.¹

22. The global instrument to combat anti-social behaviours is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime that came into force in September 2003, and now ratified by 63 Member States. Significant are also its three attached instruments, targeting specific manifestations of crime: the Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants, and the Protocol on Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. In December 2003, another major building-block of the world system of good governance was put in place, when the UN Convention against Corruption was adopted, since signed by 104 countries and ratified by one. It will come into effect after 30 countries ratify it.

23. These Conventions, combined with other earlier international legal instruments (for example the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the

¹ The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime does, however, contain a definition of what constitutes an ‘organized criminal group’ based on the premise that it matters little in what activities such a group may be engaged in. This is regarded to be a “structured group, of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with [the] Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.” (see Article 2(a) of the Convention).
Rights of the Child), provide an increasingly comprehensive global response to injustice and insecurity. The United Nations Standards for human rights in the context of the justice and the rule of law are another foundation of the system.

24. These instruments provide a legal framework, a stimulus for action and a systematic way of organizing action to contain the manifestations of a-social behaviour. Prevention, especially the elimination of the root causes of crime, poverty and lawlessness is equally important: key to this is good governance and the rule of law. These are core concerns of the United Nations, with all agencies expected to play a role in defining a common denominator for action and a framework for joint implementation work.

25. The paper outlines the key characteristics of organized crime, with emphasis placed on its global dimensions and on the required international response. In turn, the impact of organized crime in key areas – peace and security, development and human rights – is assessed, and action steps for the UN system proposed.

II. Organized crime and corruption as multinational undertakings

26. In the last decade, organized crime has evolved, propelled by the opening of markets (globalization), facilitated by new communication technologies, and pressured by important law enforcement successes. As a result, crime groups today resemble complex networks of business conglomerates able to blend illegality with legitimate business. Some of the key characteristics of organized crime groups are illustrated in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Characteristics of organized crime groups](Source: UNODC)
27. Gone are the hierarchical structures (the families, the cartels, the cupolas and alike), specialized only in violence and therefore easily cast to the margins of society. Such groups have fragmented, replaced by an explosion of complex networks of criminal organizations whose activities span many countries, where governments may have different capacities and/or levels of political commitment to combat the problem. In short, available evidence shows that crime groups are more pervasive and dynamic in organization and have broadened their scope of operations, geographically and by sector: that is, not merely transnational and specialized, but trans-continental and diversified. The trend will continue in conjunction with globalization.

28. Criminal organizations are not purely creatures of the underworld. Their ‘business’ (bloody as it may be) crosses into the realm of legitimate commerce. For example, the vehicles (containers, for example) for illicit trafficking are the same as for legitimate business; the arteries for the transport of illicit drugs and other contraband are often not unregistered ships or un-marked airplanes arriving at isolated airports, but commercial shipping, postal systems and couriers – the transport and communication network lying at the very heart of global trade. The profits from illegal activities are also almost always invested in the legal economy.

29. Just like legitimate business, organized crime today pursues multiple activities. While drug trafficking remains a key specialization, criminal organizations also engage in trafficking of whatever is available for profit – from nuclear waste and firearms, to protected species, cultural artefacts and even human beings. Cyber-links enable sophisticated fraud scams, by facilitating economic and financial transactions between people mutually unaware of who they are, where they are, and what their motives might be.

30. The violence that accompanies organized criminal activities weighs heavily on the victims. Think in particular of women kidnapped and trafficked for sexual exploitation, of children brutalized and then disposed of, of people of all ages forced into labour with little or no pay. On all continents human resources are sold and bought for quick return, vulnerable to the spread of disease, most particularly HIV/AIDS. Organized crime causes massive human rights violations, with education, health services, even freedom, denied in modern forms of slavery – from sweatshops in urban centres to exploitation camps in rural areas.

31. Transnational crime groups engage in extensive violence to bend victims’ resolve: threats and intimidation are targeted at public officials and at common citizens to gain acquiescence. Violence needs not be bloody: identity papers are destroyed, fear (including of retaliation against next-of-kin) is instilled, the risk of illness or the refusal of medical treatment (in brothels and at the work-place) are used as an instrument of coercion. At other times, violence may include forcing a woman to use or not use birth control, or to have or not have an abortion.

32. Crime undermines the human security of millions of citizens. In its most extreme forms, organized criminal activity is the cause of the perpetuation of humanitarian crises, starting from conflicts that are rendered more difficult to settle because of the greed and the illegal exploitation of assets in war-torn lands. In many urban areas, large populations live in constant fear for their life as a result of drug-related violence, town and city government are undermined, with communities being regulated not by consensus, but through fear. In this way, organized crime impacts heavily on the
control and management of urban settlements, where, taking advantage of weak local government structures and governance mechanisms, it exerts a heavy influence on public investments, resource management and the daily livelihood of people. Cities are very often both the organizational nodes as well as the markets for illegal goods of international criminal networks.

33. Then there is the intangible aspect of the problem: the penetration of national governments, economic sectors, even people’s minds and hearts. Almost everywhere, organized crime and high-level corruption are inter-dependent, one depending on the other in the conduct of business and in the search for a cover for illicit activities. Corruption often reaches into governments and parliaments, undermining the state and its institutions. Not only do crime groups engage in bribery to ensure the movement of contraband (be this drugs, weapons, or any other illegal commodity) across borders; they also engage in extensive political corruption. As a consequence, criminal groups gain political influence and render the administration of law less equal and fair. With the risk of public retaliation weakened, the reward of corruption becomes even more attractive: fighting corruption is integral to fighting organized crime.

III. Organized crime and corruption as global threats

34. While organized crime was first extensively studied in the context of the developed world (beginning in the 1950s), recent evidence suggests that the threat has now reached global proportions. Not only does organized crime continue to occur in rich countries (think of mafia-style behaviours, or more simply of recent corporate crimes): it is now increasingly present in developing countries. Given the scarcity of resources in these cases (to cushion the blows) the impact is of course even greater.

35. The rapid growth of organized crime in developing countries has been greatly facilitated, amongst other factors, by weak, even collapsed states; wars and ethnic strife; mass poverty and wealth inequality; and, high levels of corruption. In many cases, of course, it is difficult to discern whether such factors are a cause or the consequence of organized crime. Many fragile societies are trapped in a vicious cycle, where organized crime creates the conditions for its own growth, and countries are gradually weakened in their ability both to fight criminality, and to achieve decent levels of security and development.

36. While common denominators and shared features prevail, the nature of organized crime varies, depending on place and time. Marginalisation may push individuals to seek economic opportunities through illicit rather than licit means. Or, civil conflicts may push protagonists to seek control of resources (under, as much as above, ground), to bankroll their war effort, with organized crime acting as a mid-wife.

37. Like most social phenomena, illicit trade (and its links to organized crime) is driven by supply and demand, and by strong international linkages. Developed countries are often the consumers of illegal commodities (such as drugs, pirated primary resources, or counterfeits) trafficked from weak
states or conflict zones. Contraband, such as motor vehicles or firearms, stolen in developed countries often make their way to criminal groups operating outside of them.

38. A good example of this interrelationship between developed and developing regions is the global pattern of trafficking in human beings (Figure 2). Countries of origin for trafficking in human beings are mainly Central and Eastern European, African and Asian states. Countries of destination are mainly those of the industrialized world. A similar pattern also characterizes the smuggling of migrants.

![Figure 2: Global human trafficking patterns](Source: UNODC)

39. The consequences of international illicit trafficking – be it of narcotic drugs, human beings or firearms – are often felt in local communities. Take the case of a small town, where the sale of illicit drugs and the associated presence of prostitution (often by enslaved women) are connected to the violent use of unregistered firearms by criminal groups fighting for turf.

40. Importantly too, the sophistication of the banking sector, combined with the global reach of the Internet, have dramatically reduced the importance to crime and corruption of physical boundaries. For example, the fraudulent use of credit and debit cards by sophisticated organized crime groups making use of advanced counterfeiting technologies has now become a truly globalized business. By making use of off-the-shelf technologies, data from genuine credit cards can be compromised in one country in the morning, counterfeit cards produced in the afternoon in another country, then used that evening elsewhere again. The countries may not even be on the same continent. In the year 2000 alone global losses for fraud using plastic cards was estimated to be in excess of US$ 2 billion.²

41. The global nature of today’s organized crime requires a global response, *relying first and foremost on increased international cooperation*. The international community cannot surrender to the notion that crime and corruption are social malaises, unavoidable because so widely spread. Since

---

unconditional surrender is not an option, the tough question is: at the United Nations are we doing enough about these social evils, individually and jointly?

42. This issue is considered next, including several proposals for UN action.

IV. IMPACT ON ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION

43. The activities of organized criminal groups have a profound influence on the three areas the Secretary-General identified in his report on the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration: (i) peace and security, (ii) development, and (iii) human rights, democracy and good governance.3

A. Peace and security

44. Ongoing conflicts, as well as civil and political strife, are closely linked to the formation and growth of criminal networks. Conflicts and instability in the Andean region; West, Central and Southern Africa; Central Asia; and South Eastern Europe have all been intimately associated with the growth of powerful criminal organizations. War not only generates instability, in which organized crime thrives; it provides opportunity for illicit enrichment, through the creation of profitable new markets for smuggled goods (for example, natural resources and weapons). Criminal networks often constitute an important interface between legitimate commercial operations and dishonest groups within conflict zones.

45. In many conflict situations local warlords plunder entire regions and use their power for trading in weapons, drugs and local primary resources. Such warlords often block progress towards conflicts resolution, and strive for the perpetuation of anarchy and lawlessness under which their illegitimate business activities can thrive. Warlords and acolytes also violate human rights and humanitarian law. Given that they often operate under the guise of political motivations and their activities include both common and war crimes, warlords constitute a particular hybrid form of organized crime that pose significant policy challenges.

46. In most post-conflict situations, the growth of organized crime constitutes a challenge to the development of reformed institutions (police, customs and the judiciary). From Afghanistan to Iraq, from the Caucasus to the Balkans, in West as much as in East Africa, the evolution of criminal organizations poses an obstacle to achieving stable, more prosperous societies.4

---

3 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of the Millennium Declaration, Fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, 2 September 2003, A/58/323.
47. Organized crime networks have been involved in the trafficking of firearms to, within and from conflict zones. This has had a dramatic impact on levels of casualties during the conflict and of criminal violence after it, both within states engulfed by conflict and in surrounding lands. Organized criminal groups, acting for profit, have reportedly also attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

48. As recognized by Security Council resolution 1373, the links between criminal activities and terrorism are important. Similarly, Security Council resolution 1456 stressed the need to prevent terrorists from making use of transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money laundering and illicit arms trafficking. Indeed, during the last three decades, the production and trafficking of illicit drugs have become a major source of income for terrorist groups, in (but not confined to) Latin America, Central and South East Asia. The connections between organized crime and terrorist groups are now a key security challenge.

49. An assessment of the ways and means to counter warlords is essential if society wishes to combat organized crime in conflict zones. Such interventions must include the use of targeted law enforcement, progressively escalating from ‘naming and shaming’ of those with criminal links, to sanctions, to the regulation of natural resources, to the establishment of special tribunals and prosecutors.

50. More focus is also required on the development of local specialized investigative skills to counter organized crime in post-conflict societies, including sensitivity to the needs of particularly vulnerable groups, such as women and children. Policing interventions in such environments must be viewed as an integral part of the rule-of-law continuum, coupled with parallel interventions in the other components of the criminal justice system such as the judiciary and penal systems. It is paramount that these issues are considered in the early stages of emergency and reconstruction, so that an appropriate basis is set for the development of innovative initiatives, the involvement of the community and the strengthening of local government structures to be able to counter organized crime through prevention and local action.

**Action 1:** Respond effectively to the links between organized crime, corruption and conflict – and the resulting challenges for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction – by:

a. Using available expertise to ascertain the nature and extent of organized crime in conflict situations, as well as during the initial assessment phase of peacekeeping missions.

b. Building the combating of organized crime into the work of UN agencies involved in post-conflict and peacebuilding operations.

c. Collaborating in preventing and combating the trafficking of women and children to and from conflict and post-conflict zones, in particular those involving refugee and other displacement situations, including through the development and enforcement of strict codes of conduct for UN personnel.

---

d. Developing training curricula and recommending training modalities for peacekeepers on action against organized crime, trafficking in human beings and corruption.

**Action 2:** Develop strategies to prevent trafficking of small arms and light weapons by organized crime in conflict zones, through the establishment and monitoring of systems of marking of firearms as outlined by the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, as well as better cross-border law enforcement.

**Action 3:** Ensure effective collaboration to prevent and combat money laundering and financing of terrorism.

**Action 4:** Collect and analysis global data on incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, as well as biological- and chemical weapon relevant materials, and the involvement of organized crime.

### B. Development

51. There is a causal, bi-modal link between organized crime and unsustainable development. On the one hand, organized crime directly impacts upon the ability of States to achieve sustainable development. This becomes evident if the UNODC index of organized crime is measured against UNDP’s Human Development Index. The UNODC index is composed of a number of indicators, including the extent of smuggling in a number of illicit commodities, public and business perceptions of the degree of organized crime and corruption, and the extent of crimes such as homicide, robbery and corruption closely connected to organized criminal activity. A detailed overview of this data on a country-by-country basis indicates that high levels of organized crime correlate with low levels of human development.

52. On the other hand, underdevelopment and institutional weakness provide the context for organized crime and corruption to thrive. Organized crime bends markets out of shape. Legal practices are undermined by unrelated risks, investments and business decisions are distorted. Criminal organizations often operate through ‘front companies’, blurring licit and illicit business. Such companies undermine especially new business by undercutting prices. They can do so by making their profits from illegal activities, effectively eliminating honest competitors.

53. In developing economies, the activities of organized criminal groups impact directly upon the poor, who have few savings or resources to absorb the costs. The shadow economy fed by illicit profits means that there is less of a revenue base for education, health care, pensions, and other necessities. Criminal groups even target development agencies: so much that a better understanding is urgently required about how the UN system, especially technical and humanitarian assistance, could protect itself from criminal (or corrupt) activity. Criminal groups also target government services such as pension payouts, often the key source of resources in deprived areas. Criminal organizations have also had profound impacts on communities through the fostering of local criminal economies.
that subvert established systems of local governance. In more exposed countries this constitutes a serious impediment to municipal government.

54. Economic and financial crime is widely spread, involving investors across the world. The most severe damage occurs usually to the banking systems of developing countries. Such illicit activities may rival trafficking in illicit drugs as a source of criminal profits. They may even hurt the international financial system.\(^6\)

55. Taking advantage of weak local government and failing administration, organized crime exerts control on cities, it manages urban resources, determining the right to housing or other services. In addition, it influences, through corruption and cooption of officials, decisions on land management and public investment, diverting them from public good to personal interests and illicit financial gain. When appropriate regulation and enforcement is not forthcoming, entire sectors of the urban economy may become organized under the ‘supervision’ of local gangs or warlords. The example of transport systems in many African cities is one such case.

56. Perhaps the most palpable, and least visible way in which organized crime undermines development is by driving away investors. Few companies expose their executives to kidnapping, violence or extortion. Parts of Latin America, and progressively Africa, are indeed cases in point.

57. Organized criminal activity also has longer-term impacts on culture, by stealing and trading in cultural property, often during civil strife. The cultural heritage of some societies risks being lost.

58. With the adoption and entry into force of a large number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and their translation into national law, activities such as the illegal trade in endangered species and ozone depleting substances are now considered a criminal offence by States Parties. These are crucial measures to control a trade that has been substantial, is increasing and often run by organized crime.

59. Some important interventions to counter these challenges are underway, technical assistance and training is being provided to countries to counter the laundering of the proceeds of crime and to build more transparent financial systems, as well as supporting efforts at judicial reform and strengthening the rule of law. These activities provide a critical building block in tackling the issues outlined above, but importantly, must be combined with initiatives aimed at reforming and strengthening criminal justice systems, most notably the judiciary, in order to provide the necessary legal and institutional framework for sustained development.

**Action 5:** Develop of mechanisms to assist governments to prevent illicit trafficking and to recover illicit assets, including those arising from corruption by State officials.

**Action 6:** Review existing rules and practices concerning the delivery of technical cooperation including through procurement, with a view to preventing leakage of funds through corruption.

---

Action 7: Study the relationship of organized crime to urban planning, investments in urban development, and develop strategies to strengthen the role of local government and civil society in preventing organized crime and fighting its manifestations.

Action 8: Investigate how existing international instruments aimed at preventing the trafficking in cultural property\(^7\) can be further complemented by interventions designed specifically to tackle the involvement of organized crime groups.

Action 9: In the area of environmental protection, develop a strategic response to the involvement of organized crime groups in the trafficking of illicit commodities such as endangered species.

C. Human rights, democracy and governance

60. Organized crime groups directly undermine human rights, subjecting individuals and communities to high levels of violence, fear and increased exposure to disease. Most vulnerable are the poor, those with fewer alternatives, who are more easily victims of threats and deception.

61. To a great extent organized crime syndicates cause HIV/AIDS epidemics among injecting drug users, in prisons and in the sex industry. The complex relationship between organized crime and HIV/AIDS can be illustrated by developments in Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia in the course of the last decade. After the break up of the former Soviet Union, various social institutions ceased functioning in the newly independent states, particularly the drug control and the health care sectors, and, as a consequence, there was a huge influx and increased availability of drugs, organized by international and national crime syndicates.

62. This development led to a dramatic rise in the number of drug users. For example, in the Russian Federation, the number of registered drug users more than doubled from 1998 to 2003. The real number of injecting drug users (IDUs) alone is estimated at about 2 million. Injecting drug use carries a significant risk of HIV transmission, and as a result the incidence rates for HIV infection have increased dramatically. Today, it is estimated that there are approximately one million people living with HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation, a significant proportion – estimated in 2002 at well over 50 percent – having acquired the disease through using contaminated needles when injecting drugs. Heterosexual transmission and transmission while in prison are other modes in which HIV/AIDS has spread in Eastern Europe, Russia and China. The rapid increase in drug use in these lands was in large part a result of organized crime groups seeking to create an expanded market for illicit drugs.

\(^7\) These are: the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, and in particular the Second Protocol of 1999; and, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property of 1970.
63. The situation in Central Asia is even more worrying. Here there has been a particularly rapid increase in drug abuse given these countries’ exposure to drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Figure 3 shows the number of registered cases of HIV/AIDS in Central Asia since 1999 as compared to an estimate of the proportion of cases regarded to be related to injecting drug use. The average proportion of HIV/AIDS cases related to injecting drug use in 2003 for the region as a whole is estimated to be in the order of 75 percent. In China the equivalent measure is 79 per cent; in Russia and Ukraine it could be as high as 90 per cent.

![Figure 3: HIV/AIDS transmission in Central Asia through injecting drug use](Source: UNODC)

64. The trafficking of human beings and their sexual exploitation is one of the most terrifying violations of human rights. Gender based violence against women and girls, as a result of trafficking, includes rape, forced or unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. The exploitation of children either for forced labour or forced sex, including paedophilia, have traumatic consequences for young people, undercutting their chances of living normal and productive lives.

65. Criminal groups engaged in the smuggling of migrants destroy lives at the early stage. Individuals, whether trafficked for exploitation or smuggled for labour, have difficulty returning to their home countries, including practical difficulties resulting from the loss of identification and travel documents. In some cases the obstacles to return may be related to the fear (and stigma) of the treatment that awaits them. In certain circumstances, refugee recognition may be warranted. Criminal groups engaged in the trafficking of human organs and body parts also target the poor and the vulnerable.

66. Modern technology, most notably the Internet, has provided new opportunities for sexual exploitation. As recognized by the World Summit on the Information Society in December 2003, the

---

8 This includes data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Data was not available for Turkmenistan.
potential for information and communication technology to promote the development goals of the Millennium Declaration is dependent on, amongst other factors, the promotion of a global culture of cyber-security, including through the prevention of information and communication technologies being used to promote violence, all forms of child abuse, including paedophilia and child pornography, and trafficking in, and exploitation of, human beings.

67. A growing market for international ‘sex tourism’, which includes the sexual abuse of children, has also been exploited by organized criminal networks involved in trafficking of human beings.

68. Apart from undercutting human rights, organized criminal groups actively work to subvert democratic process, including through influencing judicial systems and the outcome of elections and the ‘buying off’ of elected officials. Transparent and well-functioning judicial systems (including law enforcement, prosecutors and judges) are crucial to limiting the power and influence of organized crime. Similarly, more transparent systems to promote accountability are needed to eliminate the links between organized crime and political party funding. In many countries, widespread public suspicion that judicial systems are corrupt and that criminal acts are committed by elites in both the private and public sectors undercuts government legitimacy and undermines the rule of law. In short, countries that are ineffective in enforcing the rule of law are likely to have significantly higher levels of organized crime.10

69. A clear criterion for preventing and combating organized crime, as well as holding other countries to the standards necessary to achieve this, is the presence of political will and commitment.

**Action 10:** In order to counter trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants in a more effective and collaborative way:

a Formulate the principles of a joint strategy for information campaigns on trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, including the provision of relevant information on available channels for legal migration. Cooperate in international awareness raising campaigns targeting visitors to some countries in order to counter the problem of ‘sex tourism’.

b Develop joint initiatives aimed at building local capacity to effectively counter trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, with particular attention to women and children, taking into account the respective mandates of individual agencies.

**Action 11:** In relation to the links between organized crime, drug trafficking and the spread of HIV/AIDS, the following initiatives should be undertaken:

a Build local capacity to provide care, support and counselling services for repatriated victims of trafficking with HIV/AIDS notwithstanding whether they are in countries of origin, destination or transit. In particular, such interventions must address the reproductive and sexual health needs of victims, including the consequences of sexual violence.

---

10 This conclusion is based on analysis conducted by UNODC that measure levels of organized crime against a World Bank measure for the rule of law.
b Work towards providing care and support to victims of trafficking with HIV/AIDS. Assess, as a matter of urgency, the levels of HIV/AIDS in prisons and implement harm reduction measures.

**Action 12:** Collaborate to find creative mechanisms to prevent and assess the impact of organized crime on human rights, including emphasising the importance of effective systems of integrity and oversight in law enforcement agencies specifically assigned with this task.

## V. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

70. Organized crime is evolving rapidly and now constitutes one of the key security challenges facing the global community. New and recent trends, including the expansion of the number of weak states and the presence of zones of conflict and instability, are having a dramatic impact on the nature and development of organized crime. Increasingly, the activities of organized criminal networks are expanding beyond their traditional sectors of trafficking. Already organized crime groups are heavily involved in the trafficking of human beings and there are indications of a growing trend towards sophisticated fraud in the financial and other sectors.

71. These and other developments suggest that, more than ever before, confronting organized crime must rely on a holistic response that is based not only on the establishment of more effective instruments of law enforcement, but on ensuring the long term success of political, economic and social development processes. There is thus a need for the UN system to pay much greater attention to the crosscutting impact of transnational organized crime, using the momentum generated by the entry into force of the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and of its three Protocols and the adoption of the Convention against Corruption.

72. It should be emphasised that effectively enforcement of these Conventions relies on adequately functioning criminal justice systems. A key focus therefore must rest on institution building, in particular in the area of criminal justice.

73. Some data on the extent, nature and impact of organized crime has been presented here. This is just the beginning of a process of learning how trends in organized crime can be effectively measured and monitored. Information gathering across a variety of sectors on the nature and impact of organized criminal activity is essential to effectively combating the problem. UNODC has developed some expertise in this regard and will continue to work on strengthening its capacity in conjunction with the UN system and other relevant partners. The aim of the UN system should be to develop a network of expertise on issues of organized crime and corruption, in order to facilitate the dissemination of information on trends and best practices.

74. All agencies involved in issues related to peace and security, development, governance and human rights need to review their activities so that the UN system’s response to issues of organized crime and corruption to date can be documented. Many UN system organizations, including the World
Bank and IMF, have a substantive and mutually reinforcing role to play in this regard. Strategies, based on a common understanding of the problems, need to be developed and an action plan of joint activities addressing, for example, trafficking in human beings, alternative livelihoods, HIV/AIDS, money laundering and corruption needs to be prepared.

The Resident Coordinator system

75. There is a need, therefore, for all agencies to cooperate at the field level to address the issues of organized crime and corruption in order to fulfil their own mandates with maximum efficiency. The situation in the respective country should be assessed with regard to each of the major areas covered in this paper and an analysis and achievement indicators included in the Common Country Assessment. Responses to the problems should likewise be integrated into the country UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) by the UN country team.

Partnerships

76. The role of, and the UN’s collaboration and coordination with, specialized international organizations outside the UN system is crucial. These would include notably the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as related regional organizations.

77. Non-governmental organizations also need to be included in a comprehensive response to organized crime as they hold a wealth of information and have an outreach to populations not readily accessible to the international community. UNODC collaborates, for instance, with Transparency International on corruption information and sub-contracts local NGOs to implement victim support segments of criminal justice and human trafficking projects. NGOs often possess strong lobbying power that can be effectively utilized.

78. Local government is a key (and often ignored) partner in countering both organized criminal activity and its impact. More effective systems of local regulation, for example, of alcohol sales, prostitution, or taxis, as well as targeted urban renewal projects constitute important interventions by municipal government.

Prevention

79. Critical to any discussion of how the UN system should confront organized crime is a focus on preventing its occurrence. It should be noted that both the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Convention against Corruption contain detailed provisions in respect of preventive measures, including provisions for the sharing of information amongst states and on promoting public awareness as to the threat posed by organized crime and the related problem of corruption.\footnote{Article 31 of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Chapter II of the Convention against Corruption.} The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime urges State Parties to participate in projects aimed at the prevention of transnational organized crime through, for example, “by alleviating the circumstances that render socially marginalized groups vulnerable to the action of the transnational organized crime”.\footnote{Article 31 (7).} The Convention against Corruption contains specific provisions on the prevention of money laundering.\footnote{Article 14.}

80. The comprehensive response to organized crime argued for in this paper presumes that law enforcement interventions are the last resort, and that an array of policy interventions are required both to make societies less attractive for organized criminal and victims less vulnerable to being exploited by criminal groups. Greater debate is required across the UN system as to the viability of various interventions in this respect, along with a more systematic mechanism in which lessons can be learnt and best practices refined in the area of prevention. This includes the critical area of awareness raising and civic education.
Attachment 4

The World Summit on the Information Society
and Bridging the Digital Divide

Note prepared by ITU

I. BACKGROUND

1. The topic of “Bridging the Digital Divide” is one of two main issues before the UN system in 2004, as part of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. The HCLP will submit a report and recommendations on this matter to the fall 2004 meeting of the CEB.

2. The issue of the Digital Divide is also a key component of the agenda of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The idea of holding the Summit began with a resolution adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conferences of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1998. The proposal for the Summit was welcomed by the then ACC in 1999. The WSIS was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2001 and 2002 (UNGA Res. 56/183 and Res. 57/238).

3. This Note reports on the outcome of the first phase of the Summit in the context of the system-wide consideration of the Digital Divide.

II. AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO SUMMITS

4. The preparation and holding of WSIS introduce several innovations to the holding of global summits.

5. The issues of the Information Society touch on the mandates of many CEB members. For that reason, in 1999 the CEB established the High Level Summit Organizing Committee, to coordinate the role and input of UN agencies in WSIS. HLSOC is chaired by the ITU Secretary-General and met formally on two occasions and at working level five times to prepare for the first phase. HLSOC was instrumental in providing input to WSIS that led to recognition of the importance of international organizations in implementing the Geneva Action Plan adopted by governments. In addition, HLSOC can play a key role in preparing the report of the system on Bridging the Digital Divide.

6. Another departure is the holding of the Summit in two phases. The first phase took place in Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 and the second is scheduled for Tunisia on 16-18 November 2005. This two-step process and the involvement of host countries from the north and south is facilitating a full consideration of all relevant issues and is promoting accountability of Summit output, since the second phase can review the achievements in the period following the first phase. Several difficult issues that could not be resolved in Geneva can be further examined for consideration in Tunisia.
7. WSIS achieved further progress in the involvement of all stakeholders in major societal issues. Both the private sector and civil society were closely involved in the Summit preparations and contributed significantly to the meetings of the preparatory Committee. Civil society formed a bureau to represent its diverse viewpoints, and both that bureau and the private sector met on several occasions with the governmental bureau of the Summit.

8. Finally, the Summit was organised on the basis of voluntary donations of funding and staff. The UNGA did not provide any funding for WSIS and the ITU governing bodies only allocated minimal sums. Given its multidisciplinary nature, the ITU organised an Executive Secretariat based in Geneva to prepare the Summit, consisting of experts detached from governments, UN agencies, civil society and the private sector. Finances for the Summit preparations was obtained through a fundraising campaign to attract voluntary contributions.

III. OUTCOME OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

9. Issues related to the Digital Divide are at the very heart of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The Summit was the first gathering of global leaders to address this issue and the second phase will give fresh impetus to efforts to find solutions.

10. The Summit was organized by ITU, with the support of many UN agencies, through the High Level Summit Organizing Committee (HLSOC) chaired by the Secretary-General of the ITU.

11. The first phase of the Summit took place in Geneva, on 10-12 December 2003, and the second phase is scheduled for 16-18 November 2005, in Tunisia.

12. The first phase was widely considered to be a successful endeavor. The Summit was attended by nearly 50 Heads of State or Government, and Vice Presidents. More than 11,000 delegates participated in the deliberations, representing 176 Member States. The meeting was also attended by:
   • 3,300 representatives of civil society;
   • 514 business representatives from ninety-nine organizations;
   • 87 international organizations;
   • more than 1,000 journalists.

13. The first phase was also the occasion for more than 300 Summit-related events in Geneva, including major meetings organized by many different UN agencies and other regional and international organisations.

14. The WSIS core outputs from the first phase are contained in two documents – a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action – that were agreed at the end of the preparatory process immediately before Geneva and adopted by governments in plenary at the Summit.
15. Essentially, the core documents set out a strong statement of the case for ICTs in development built around an assumption that the wider use of ICTs will lead to the creation of an Information Society. This may be defined as a society in which social and economic development is based at least as much on the use of information/knowledge and on the exchange of services as on industry, manufacturing or agriculture. In the core documents, ICTs are presented as fundamental instruments of this progress in human society, and their advancement and promotion by governments and other stakeholders as prerequisites for its achievement.

16. The UN Secretary-General expressed a very positive attitude to ICTs in his opening remarks to the Summit, pointing out that it was perhaps the first UN summit to be built around an opportunity rather than a problem. Reflecting this sentiment, the core documents overwhelmingly deal with the opportunities presented by ICTs rather than the challenges they pose. The Declaration defines characteristics of the Information Society that should or must ensure its conformity with principles of equality, human rights and social development; the Plan of Action lists activities which could, should or must be taken to harness ICTs potential to contribute toward this human progress. Together, the documents represent a forceful statement of the case for ICTs, including specific targets for connectivity and ICT deployment and applications that could be implemented nationally and internationally alongside the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

17. More specifically, the Declaration sets forth eleven key principles. Key among them are the importance of infrastructure as an essential foundation of the Information Society, the need for affordable access to information and knowledge, capacity building, enabling environment, building confidence and security in the use of ICTs, applications and international and regional cooperation.

18. The Plan of Action can be subdivided into two parts. The first is a set of objectives and action lines to be achieved by 2015, with a main intent to ensure access to information and communications by all citizens, coupled with specific targets and dates to connect all key institutions (schools, hospital, etc.) The second part of the Action Plan links the principles of the Declaration with specific Actions. Although the Plan of Action is addressed to all stakeholders, in many sections, it refers specifically to tasks to be undertaken by international organizations and to efforts to assist governments.

19. Since the Summit is in two phases, delegates had the luxury of deferring resolution of several key issues until a later stage. The Declaration and Plan of Action call upon the Secretary-General of the UN to establish a Working Group on Internet governance and a Task Force on the financing mechanisms to bridge the Digital Divide (referred to as the Digital Solidarity Fund), to study and report on these issues.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN SYSTEM

20. To assess the implications of the Digital Divide for the UN system requires a multi-faceted conceptual understanding of the issue.

21. At its deepest level, the Digital Divide calls forth a reflection on the role of technology in the emerging Information Society. In developed countries, it is clear that ICTs and technology are radically transforming society and its institutions. These effects can be seen in areas ranging from governance, employment and trade, to education, medicine and culture. The WSIS painted some early brush strokes, but the vision of the Information Society remains to be placed into clearer focus. Issues such as privacy, human rights, cultural diversity, and the nature of social interaction are evolving rapidly in light of the power and ubiquity of technology.

22. At a second level, modern technology can be a powerful tool to rapidly achieving national societal and economic objectives, provided that governments adopt effective strategies. The WSIS expressed the view that ICTs must be an important part of national development strategies since they may provide a means for less-developed countries to leapfrog into the 21st century. At this level, ICTs are a cross-cutting phenomenon with relevance to many of the objectives of the UN system and its myriad institutions and offer the promise of more efficient and rapid solutions to age-old problems, such as poverty and hunger. In response to the Geneva outputs of the WSIS, the UN system will need to consider the role ICTs have in their work, and how they could make a better use of them to fulfill their mandates. While some agencies can intervene directly to reduce the digital divide, others can benefit from new technologies, through e-applications, to improve the impact and effectiveness of their work on the territory.

23. At a third, and more granular level, ICTs can be used to improve specific aspects of daily life. At this level, the targeted use of ICTs in a variety of e-applications must be assessed. Shared experiences as to the best means to implement such applications, e.g. e-learning and e-medicine, can serve as guideposts for developing countries. The environment is littered with failed technologies, and it is vital that the developing countries avoid costly failures. At this level, focus must be given to measures to acquire the necessary infrastructure that permits the fullest use of ICTs at the national and community levels, and to removing the impediments that currently block or hinder such use. Each member of the UN family should consider how ICTs can best be deployed in strategies to achieve its mandate. The extent to which ICTs create new problems that need to be addressed, (e.g. intellectual property rights in the digital age, or new threats from organized crime), is also a serious matter for reflection by the system.

24. The fourth level is more mundane, but nonetheless of importance. Each agency must now determine how it will adjust its work methods in the new technological office environment. In a period of cutbacks and strained institutional budgets, organizations must make reasoned decisions as to the acquisition and use of the most appropriate technologies. New technologies can also be used to improve the efficiency of such institutions as the CEB and HLCP; email and
teleconferencing are already taken for granted. The HLCM is already examining the use of technology in the working methods of the UN system.

25. The encompassing and multi-disciplinary nature of the Digital Divide suggests a set of variegated approaches by the UN system.

26. To begin, a **programmatic** approach needs to be refined and considered. Each agency should review its mandate to determine whether and how its current activities impact on the Digital Divide. The use of ICTs needs to be mainstreamed into the development agenda, and more fundamentally should become a key element of reflection in actions that address a wide range of social, economic and political objectives. Linkages need to be established between and among the various e-applications that fall within the mandates of different agencies, to ensure that a shared vision of the Information Society emerges. In its second phase, WSIS may provide an overarching policy framework that contributes to this process.

27. The issue of the Digital Divide also necessitates a **structural** approach. Within the system. While aspects of the Digital Divide touch on the mandates of many institutions, there is at present no centralizing entity within the UN system to coordinate a response to the challenge. The ITU has played the lead role in organizing the WSIS, with the active assistance of the HLSOC members. As we go forward, and as the role of technology and ICTs increases in all societies, careful consideration needs to be given on ways to improve the structural approach to these issues in the UN system. At a minimum, means must be found to avoid duplication and to enhance the efficiency of the system-wide response.

28. Finally, an **operational approach** needs to be developed by the HLCP to prepare the necessary materials for consideration by the CEB at its fall 2004 meeting.

29. The organization of the second phase of the WSIS is an important part of this process. In addition to developing a roadmap for the second phase and establishing a set of objectives for the Tunis output, considerable efforts now have to be made to implement the Geneva Declaration and Plan of Action. The HLSOC can be expected to play a major coordinating role in this effort. The next meeting of the HLSOC has been set for 1 April 2004 in Vienna. The HLSOC can also prepare reports and recommendation on the Digital Divide for review by HLCP and submission to the CEB at its fall 2004 meeting.

30. The Working Group on Internet Governance and the Task Force on financing to be established by the Secretary-General will provide major inputs to the second phase. The UN ICT Task Force can also be expected to play an important role in this process.
Attachment 5

WSSD follow-up

Elements for a system-wide collaborative arrangement
in the field of energy

Background

1. At its 6th session, HLCP reviewed the status of collaborative arrangements for an effective system-wide follow up of WSSD and its JPOI. It requested its Vice-Chairman to submit proposals on such arrangements in the field of energy (Decision # 4-CEB/HLCP-6).

2. This paper is in response to that request. It draws upon two earlier papers considered by the Committee at its 5th and 6th sessions.

Challenges to be addressed

3. The central issues for achieving sustainable energy goals were identified by CSD-9 and confirmed at WSSD and in the JPOI. These are: (i) increasing access to reliable, affordable, economically viable, socially acceptable and environmentally sound energy services and resources, (ii) improving energy efficiency, (iii) increasing the proportion of energy obtained from renewable energy sources, (iv) diversifying energy supply through advanced, cleaner, more efficient, affordable and cost effective energy technologies and (v) implementing transport strategies for sustainable development.

4. The 2000 “Energy and the Challenge of sustainability”, the outcome the World Energy Assessment under the aegis of UNDP, UN-DESA and World Energy Council, provides substantive and technical underpinning for the work at CSD-9 and should serve to guide the future orientation of the work of the UN system in this area.

Capacity of the UN system

5. The Committee has already had a preliminary review of the existing capacity of the organizations of the UN system, their ongoing programmes, to what extent these are coherent and supportive of individual efforts, the constraints in achieving global targets and the role of and relationship with non-UN system actors. A matrix of ongoing UN system activities in the field of energy shows the involvement of a range of UN system organizations, including UNDP, UN-DESA, World Bank, UNEP, UNCTAD, IAEA, UNIDO, FAO, UNESCO, WMO, UN regional Commissions, UN-Habitat as well as UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat. This analysis can be further developed once an inter-agency framework is established. Discussions in the Committee affirm that much of the work in the field of energy
–both in relation to the supply and demand aspects of it – is being undertaken in the public and private sectors.

6. Earlier discussions at HLCP have shown the need for the UN system to enhance its capacity to address various aspects of the energy issue. One element contributing to this situation is that no single entity in the UN system has the primary responsibility for dealing with all aspects of energy; each concerned organization pursues this issue independently within the context of its own mandate. This fragmented approach has constrained the capacity of the system to address the issue of energy in a more systematic, coherent and coordinated manner.

7. There is a widely held view that a system-wide mechanism is needed to bring coherence and synergies to the manner in which the energy issue is addressed by organizations of the system both in shaping global policy and influencing the activities of relevant actors towards achieving the goal of sustainable energy for all. Questions that need to be addressed now relate to identifying the most appropriate, and effective role for the UN system, and how different organizations with their specific mandates should relate to each other and to outside actors, and finally how the system’s policy-advice role to governments could be strengthened.

Requirements for system-wide collaboration

8. System-wide collaboration on energy would need to take the following elements into account:
   (i) Policy coherence in system-wide activities based on intergovernmental mandates;
   (ii) Provide a gateway for gathering and sharing information on all aspects of the issue, resources, technology, programmes, initiatives as well as on experiences in implementing the JPOI;
   (iii) Overview of ongoing work within the system and building/strengthening synergies among independent initiatives;
   (iv) Draw on past experience in inter-agency collaboration on energy;
   (v) Dynamic and action-oriented approach to coordination with extensive use of information and communication;
   (vi) Collaboration with outside actors;

9. A UN system collaborative mechanism on energy could have the following elements:
   (i) A system-wide network of all concerned organizations and entities of the UN system;
   (ii) Be substance-driven and issue, rather than process, oriented
   (iii) Rotating leadership
   (iv) Clearly identifiable secretariat support that draw upon the existing capacity within the UN system;
   (v) Its functions could include, inter alia, elements outlined in paragraph 8.

10. Given the fact that some of the key actors operate outside the system, there would be the need for a second tier mechanism to interact with outside actors, building public/private partnerships, maximizing and taking advantage of the dynamism of different ongoing initiatives outside of the UN system.
Moving Forward

11. In the light of the foregoing, HLCP may:

Agree to set up a system-wide collaborative mechanism on the lines of UN-Water and UN-Oceans and request an open-ended Task Force of experts on energy to elaborate its draft terms of reference, work programme, methods of work, substantive secretariat support, as well as modalities for interaction with outside actors. In drafting the terms of reference, the Task Force should be guided by the energy goals identified by CSD-9 and confirmed at WSSD and in the JPOI and should take account, inter alia, of elements identified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above. The Task Force should be led by a senior level official and complete its work by the end of March 2004.
## Attachment 6

### HLCP Work Programme: 2004 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>February HLCP 2004</th>
<th>April CEB 2004</th>
<th>31 May-1 June Intersessional</th>
<th>September HLCP 2004</th>
<th>October CEB 2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>Follow up to CEB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curbing Transnational crime</td>
<td>Curbing Transnational crime</td>
<td>Follow up to HLCP Decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging the Digital Divide</td>
<td>Bridging the Digital Divide</td>
<td>Bridging the Digital Divide</td>
<td>Bridging the Digital Divide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing for Development</td>
<td>Financing for Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS and its linkages with food security and governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up to WSSD</td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB Communication Strategy</td>
<td>CEB Communication Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Other items:  
- NEPAD  
- Preparations for ECOSOC  
- HLCP Work Programme | Other items:  
- HLCP Work Programme  
- HLCP-UNDG interaction |                      |                      |                  |      |