I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at UNICEF Headquarters in New York from 24 to 27 January 2011. A list of participants is attached at Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members is attached at Annex B. This was the 14th session of the IASMN since its first meeting in Vienna in 2000.

2. The IASMN members wish to express their gratitude to UNDSS and UNICEF for hosting the meeting.

3. At the outset of the meeting, the Chair welcomed participants and took the opportunity of the meeting being held in New York to introduce senior staff of the department to IASMN members.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MEETING

A. Report of the IASMN Steering Group

4. The Report of the IASMN Steering Group was provided to the members of the IASMN for their information.

B. Private Security Companies

5. The IASMN considered a paper produced by the IASMN Working Group on the Use of PSCs. The WG had been established to support DSS in taking the lead on input into the UN secretariat’s Policy Committee meeting on the UN’s use of PSCs that was expected to be held in March 2011.

6. The discussion began with the IASMN debating how options are considered when the host government’s ability to provide for the safety and security of UN personnel, premises and assets is limited. Many issues were raised, including whether local laws covered weapons and equipment and how to handle bringing in equipment that may not be nationally acceptable. DSS took the view that regardless of whether we are speaking of national or international private security companies, they would need to abide by the UN’s Use of Force policy. However, OLA took the view that while the Use of Force policy was currently in place for the guards at UN HQ, the goal was not necessarily for the UN to look into internationally accepted standards, but rather to develop its own policies, drawing from those standards and various sources and adjusting as necessary through the procurement process.

7. In considering the specific recommendations of the IAMSN WG on PSCs, one member noted that references to humanitarian and human rights law had been diluted from the current draft. OLA emphasized the need to be more legally accurate as to what the UN can and cannot do.
8. Citing the Montreato Convention, it was stressed that the UN cannot be bound or party to international conventions except in a couple of cases and that it will be guided to the extent that it was bound by international law, GA resolutions and conventions adopted by the General Assembly. Furthermore, the UN should not wish to commit to a convention that was not yet finalized.

9. The staff federations, acknowledging that this was a very big and sensitive issue for the staff, expressed the view that they were very uncomfortable with the use of PSCs, particularly armed security companies. The IASMN was reminded that at the 13th session of the IASMN, the federations had asked for a cost analysis to ascertain the cost of using PSCs against the cost of recruiting UN staff to perform the same functions. They cautioned that whatever a private contractor does will reflect directly on staff in the field and that it would take only one accidental or deliberate killing to impact the UN. When it came to accountability, should an incident spark unrest, it would ultimately be the UN that would be responsible for getting those contractors out of the country.

10. One organization shared the views of the staff federations and mentioned that it was odd that we had not yet seen anything from either the Fifth Committee or others on this issue, given just how sensitive it is, from both a moral and ethical side and that we should be coming to the tail end of policy direction on this issue at this point. It was asked that consideration be given to what oversight mechanisms may be put in place to hold PSCs accountable. At the same time, it was recognized that despite the best mechanisms, incidents will still occur. Citing the pronouncement in Afghanistan decrying PSCs, it was suggested that the UN look at contingency plans to determine what it would do in such a scenario.

11. The Chair confirmed that by taking this issue up in the Policy Committee, the intention was to regulate the use of PSCs, noting that they were already being used. He confirmed that the use of PSCs would be linked to SRAs and residual risk and further suggested that a cost efficiency study was needed. The financial aspect would be important and would, in some cases, present a hurdle to overcome. In being pushed by the Policy Committee to think about this issue what needed to be addressed was how to deal with deteriorating situations and mobilizing resources, including troop contributors in light of the fact that the UN was being asked to operate in places that are almost military conflict zones. The UN was no longer equipped to operate in those places only with policies and the existing system. In places where the UN was asked to stay, even humanitarian workers had realized that it was no longer enough to use the acceptance model.

12. The Chair emphasized that if there was going to be a policy on the use of PSCs, then it should stem from the IASMN. At the same time, it was important to understand that the IASMN did not have to move forward on this with a uniform opinion. What was needed was to merely ascertain whether the idea of using PSCs as an option in some cases was universally adopted or not supported, as it was important for the Policy Committee to know if there was dissension in the IASMN over this issue. Though one member believed that the IASMN had already clarified its position at its 13th session in Vienna in June 2010, the Chair maintained that members be canvassed at this session for their views.
13. DSS further clarified that the Policy Committee would look at the implications of using PSCs and not at the details. That would come later, with IASMN involvement. One could not underestimate what the PC decision would mean if this issue goes forward. There was a need to acknowledge that PSCs were already being used and to determine if this was an acceptable practice on the part of the UN. The Chair reminded the meeting that, within the UNSMS, there was a general belief that denying the use of PSCs would limit the options available. In this respect, the critical role contracted guards played in preventing more deaths in the Herat attack was cited.

14. The accountability of PSCs was debated, with the Chair pointing out that any company to be employed would need to follow the laws of the host country and therefore would be held accountable by that country. This differed, for example, from troop contributing companies whose troops were not subject to the laws of the host country. OLA did not have a position on the functional immunity and privileges of PSCs working for the UN.

15. A few members did not agree that the vetting of PSCs should be carried out by the UN while another member informed the meeting that it had already been vetting companies by carrying out a preliminary scan of the whole range of PSCs. The Chair informed the members that the question of vetting went back to the Montreaux document and the WG on the Use of Mercenaries. It was unrealistic to think that the UN had the capacity to vet companies. There was a need therefore to rely on other processes, such as national and industry processes. Another member believed that vetting was the least of the problems to be considered as that was essentially a procurement issue.

16. The point was raised that if it was believed that the UN’s mandate was to stay in areas of extreme danger and programs had been put through a criticality assessment to determine that the work is worth doing and will save lives, then employing PSCs could provide the means by which to stay. If this was not deemed to be the case, then the UN would leave. The Chair recognized that although using PSCs was distasteful to some, it was a last resort to consider after options such as recruiting more security personnel, protection by the host government and protection provided by Member States had been exhausted. The Chair further recognized that a primary concern in deciding whether to use armed PSCs was about morality and at the same time pointed out that PSCs did not have a monopoly on being bad. The important point to consider was not whether to accept or reject armed PSCs, but rather to consider how they are handled and the safeguards that needed to be put into place.

17. The ensuing discussion revealed that one member of the IASMN was currently bidding in Afghanistan for a guard force, while another member had used dozens of PSCs for years and had every intention of continuing to do so. Another member pointed to the importance of having specific language and clauses included in contracts with PSCs. Another noted that in his organization, the current contracting processes for PSCs were no different than that used for contracting caterers.

18. The Chair stressed the criticality of the Use of Force policy in contracting armed personnel and reiterated the need for clear standards, rules and model contracts to be put in place if armed PSCs were to be used. While recognizing that it would be impossible to devise policies to cover
every unique situation, there was nevertheless a need to be clear on legal and procurement issues. Of course, this would not be needed if the Policy Committee decided against the use of PSCs. If this were to be the case, it was likely that the UN would not stay to continue to operate in some dangerous locations. Having said this, the Chair believed that the PC would in fact support the development of policies for their use.

19. The IASMN was also informed of the recent consultations DSS had with the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. The WG supported that the UN must have some sort of oversight mechanisms in place for the use of PSCs and was currently working on the development of an international convention which, if moved forward, would provide guidance on the use of PSCs. However, as confirmed by OLA, the UN could not be bound by or a signatory to this convention. The IASMN was also informed that the Montreux document that included standards and best practices had so far received 38 signatories. The intent was to get as many member states as possible to control the source of the providers. At the same time, the PSC industry was trying to establish an international code of conduct and the Swiss government was establishing an oversight body to report on compliance with their own standards. OHCHR expressed support for these initiatives which supported the mainstreaming of human rights in the activities of the UN. OHCHR presently did not have a policy on PSCs even though the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries fell under the auspices of the Human Rights Council. Therefore, the outcome of the PC meeting would be helpful to OHCHR in developing its approach towards PSCs.

20. After a lengthy debate, IASMN members were asked to provide their views on the use of PSCs. WHO indicated that if it came to a vote, it wished to vote against their use but at the same time made clear it was not advocating that PSCs should never be used but that it should not be part of policy and rules and should not be legalized. He recognized that there were situations where it was necessary, but did not wish to vote in favour of something that was considered to be against the most basic principles of the UN. He added that if the use of PSCs was locally justified and documented then this would be fine, but simply accepting the use of PSCs because they are used in a number of places should not be condoned.

21. UNRWA also expressed reservations that made it difficult to endorse the use of PSCs. However, UNRWA could agree to exploring and developing the idea. It could not go further than this and agree to something not yet developed.

22. Two members viewed the document produced by the IASMN WG on PSCs as too general. Another member informed the IASMN that it used armed escorts but only in very noticeable exceptions and linked to very stringent conditions. DSS pointed out that a policy was needed even to regulate something exceptional whereas one member noted that an exception should never be regulated but should remain as an exception.

23. It was suggested by another member that it would be helpful for the PC to review the reflections of this group, including dissenting views. WHO was not convinced that the use of weapons and armoured vehicles would offer greater protection and that more came down to local perception. In high risk countries, he had seen that the use of lethal forces was not the right approach to their work.
24. Some members were concerned that their organization would not be represented on the Policy Committee which was largely a UN secretariat body. The Chair assured the IASMN however that their organizations would have the opportunity to weigh in at the highest level.

25. The staff federations once more reiterated their concerns and pointed out that this agenda item had been the one most discussed during the IASMN’s 13th session in Vienna. The major concern from both federations was that this effort signified the beginning of the use of PSCs. Although they recognized that they only held observer status at the IASMN, it was nevertheless important that their views on this issue were reflected for the record, including the view that the UN should first look at recruiting UN staff to do what PSCs could do.

26. Further questions were raised about the need to make the distinction between internationally managed PSCs and locally armed guards. One member saw value in separating locally used companies and international PSCs. Recognizing that there was national legislation that usually authorized private companies to arm themselves in accordance with local law, it was believed that they were not as questionable as international companies. Therefore the concept of using locally recruited armed security companies should be advocated before the use of international security companies. Another member agreed with separating the two while one participant believed that if we are at the point where we need armed guards in certain countries, consideration then needs to be given to why we operate in those countries. What also needed to be considered were the different agreements that each of the specialized agencies had signed with a number of countries.

27. The Chair asked the members to consider whether in certain countries there had been contracts with national firms using locals for armed protection or whether international firms were used for armed protection and whether this was in accordance with host country regulations and laws (e.g. if they are licensed to operate in those countries). It was not a question of impunity - if contracted legally this should be in compliance with host country regulations. If the company acted properly and was in conformity with local laws, then the UN would be exercising due diligence.

28. While the majority of IASMN members recognized there was probably a need to allow for the use of PSCs in certain situations, it was noted that the IASMN was not universally in favour of the use of PSCs and that very serious reservations and some specific objections were voiced by some members. It was clarified once more that what was being sought at this point was not a blanket endorsement of PSCs but rather a mandate to proceed with input for the PC meeting. IASMN members were also urged to discuss this issue further within their respective organizations.

Recommendations:

29. The majority of IASMN members acknowledged that the use of armed private security companies was a security risk management measure that may be needed to be employed by the UN and that the IASMN participating in the formulation of a policy for the use of armed PSCs should not be seen as supporting an ongoing/open policy and a blanket endorsement of armed PSCs. As such, the IASMN recommends that the WG on PSCs continues to work with the UN’s
Policy Committee secretariat to prepare a proposal for submission to the Policy Committee meeting which will be held at the beginning of March 2011. *(The Policy Committee on Private Security Companies is now scheduled to be held on 17 May 2011).*

30. Subject to and following the decision of the Policy Committee, the IASMN recommends that the *Security Policy Manual* be accordingly revised.

**C. Proposed Policies for the UNSMS Security Policy Manual**

31. The IASMN considered the following four policies for insertion into the UNSMS *Security Policy Manual*:

- CRP 3 (a) Measures to Avoid Risk – Alternative Work Modalities, Relocation and Evacuation
- CRP 3 (b) Security Clearance and the Travel Request Information Process (TRIP)
- CRP 3 (c) Security Level System (SLS)
- CRP 3 (d) Applicability of the UN Security Management System

32. DSS briefed the IASMN that the transition from the *Field Security Handbook* (FSH) to the *Security Policy Manual* (SPM) was moving ahead, as evident in the four new policies that had been drafted to be part of the SPM and not as stand-alone policy documents. These four policies were prioritized because they addressed the most important policy issues associated with the abolishment of the Security Phase System. The drafts presented to the IASMN were issued as interim policies after the IASMN Steering Group in order to be available to the UNSMS as of 1 January 2011, the date of the abolishment of the Security Phase System.

**a) Measures to Avoid Risk – Alternate Work Modalities, Relocation and Evacuation**

33. DSS outlined the key aspects of this policy, namely that it brought together all measures used in the UNSMS to avoid risk into one policy and linked those measures to Security Risk Management (SRM) policy (i.e., SRM options are categorized as Accept, Control, Avoid or Transfer). The link between measures to avoid risk and unacceptable residual risk was noted as was the importance to this policy of the revision of Annex I of the FSH. It was emphasized that having a clear policy on measures to avoid risk did not mean that the UNSMS was risk adverse. The IASMN was also informed that the policy contained two new terms, “Personnel Restrictions” and “Family Restrictions”, which had been included to provide the UNSMS with generic terms for when staff or family members have been relocated or evacuated without resorting to the use of the terms “family/non-family duty station” which were terms to be reserved for use by human resources professionals.

34. During the discussion, representatives of the staff federations expressed concern that the evacuation of national staff needed to be decided by the USG and that because of this such decisions could become political. The Chair pointed out that there was no difference between international and national staff when it came to security issues but that existing policy only allowed for the evacuation of national staff under exceptional circumstances when they faced a direct threat because of their employment with the UN. He pointed out that the evacuation of national staff was something that happens rarely, although it was acknowledged that this had
happened in Iraq. One staff federation added that changes in recruiting patterns over the last 15 to 20 years had shown an increase in the number of “national staff” who were not nationals of the countries where they were employed. As such, the term “locally-recruited” staff would be more accurate than the term national staff. DSS noted that all the new policies used the term “locally-recruited personnel” and not “nationally-recruited personnel” or “national staff”.

35. A few suggestions were made to amend the wording in portions of CRP 3(a). One member was concerned that the language in the policy that referred to “imminent breakdown in communications is likely” was confusing. The wording was changed to “In the event of a breakdown of communications…” Another member supported the use of the word “personnel” in the policy, as opposed to staff as this was a more accurate description. Members noted that some of the Alternate Work Modality measures referenced in the policy were not technically related to work (such as recommending dependent children stay out of school), so the policy was adjusted to emphasize that the term “Alternate Work Modalities” was a technical term specific to the policy. Members further appreciated that the policies, in referencing alternate work modalities, supported HR and Green Initiatives, as well as business continuity implications.

36. The HR Network representative was satisfied that the document made it clear where authority lay in the decision making process, but requested further clarification on staffing decisions for relocation and evacuation. DSS explained that further clarifications on those portions would be provided following the outcome of the work being done on program criticality.

37. The Chair requested that the title of the document be amended to refer to the actual measures to avoid risk, i.e. relocation and evacuation, so the title was amended to “Relocation, Evacuation and Alternate Work Modalities – Measures to Avoid Risk”.

38. The IASMN was informed of the reply that had been provided to UNIFIL in response to a request for clarification regarding security arrangements for citizens and/or residents of Lebanon who are eligible family members of UN internationally-recruited personnel stationed elsewhere, including in regards to evacuation/relocation as this had wider implications for the UNSMS. The Chair believed that there was a need to manage expectations when it came to such scenarios. Although some members pointed out situations were not always as clear-cut as that which had been described in UNIFIL’s query, there was general agreement that the response to UNIFIL was useful in clarifying eligibility criteria for the evacuation of dependants.

b) Security Clearance and the Travel Request Information Process (TRIP)

39. The new policy clarified that the purpose of the security clearance system was to monitor the number and location of personnel, provide personnel with information and, in some circumstances, control the movement of personnel. As such, it provided for “automatic security clearances” in cases where the DO decides that he/she only wanted to monitor and inform, and a provision for “manual security clearances” in cases when the DO needs to control personnel movement or numbers. The policy also clarified that the issuance of security clearances was not contingent on proof of completion of required training, including BSITF and ASITF. Although
BSITF and ASITF were requirements for travel, it was the responsibility of the individual staff member and their employing agency to ensure the training is completed.

40. The IASMN was further informed that DSS was processing over 2000 clearances a day, a testament to the functioning of TRIP. Although there were still some issues to work out and hitches to overcome, overall there had been positive feedback from clients on the functioning of the system and the IASMN recognized the commendable job done by DSS to complete the development and launch of the TRIP system in a short period of time, and agreed that TRIP was an excellent program.

41. One of the issues still to be worked out included the issue of access rights. Present access rights prevented some agency decision makers from checking the whereabouts of their staff. DSS confirmed that when the move was made from ISECT II to TRIP, security access rights were migrated and this may have been responsible for the difficulties encountered. In any case, DSS vowed to follow up on this.

42. The suggestion was made that there should be an instruction video produced on using TRIP. Another member suggested including in TRIP the provision for check boxes for individual profiles to verify that the mandatory security training had been completed. The IASMN disagreed with this and supported the draft policy that clearly made compliance with training a responsibility of each staff member and their employing organization. Another member suggested that TRIP include a disclaimer for staff to acknowledge that they read the travel advisory because staff may not print advisories or pay attention to them. It was also pointed out that important information was missing in the TRIP “personal profiles” of many staff, often because many staff did not create their own profile in TRIP.

43. There was also discussion about the decision made at the 20th session of HLCM that registering all official travel in TRIP would only be mandatory as of 2012. It was recognized that when the travel systems of organizations were fully integrated, full compliance with TRIP could be ensured, thus maximizing its usefulness to the UNSMS. Whereas ISECT had been designed to interface with other systems, TRIP had been designed to be even more flexible and to permit easy integration with organizations’ travel systems. The Chair reminded the IASMN that, in accordance with the HLCM recommendation, they would need to have their travel systems fully integrated with TRIP by the end of the year. At the same time, he reminded the IASMN of its decision that this system be used for all official travel, to the extent possible until full integration was achieved. By 1 January 2012, it will be required that all official travel is cleared through TRIP. DSS called attention to the footnote in the policy that provided for an exemption for security clearance in 2011 for official travel from “H” duty stations to “H” duty stations - the only official travel not requiring clearance through TRIP if an organization’s travel system is not integrated, as per footnote 1 of CRP 3(b).

44. There were some questions about what was meant by the operational radius and whether the DO had the authority to set or approve the operational radius. DSS provided clarification by confirming that the DO can decide on the operational radius.
45. Other organizations asked whether the USG DSS had discretionary authority to authorize security clearance for Security Level 6 areas. DSS clarified that the requirement for the USG, DSS to grant security clearance for Security Level 6 areas was already agreed by the CEB. As such, it was clarified that the USG, in consultation with the SMT and DO, grants security clearances for all official travel into Security Level 6 areas and has the option to consult with executive heads if needed (including in the EGS).

46. The IASMN generally agreed that this policy should move forward, with necessary adjustments. One agreed adjustment was that, unlike previous policy, locally-recruited personnel who are Area Security Coordinators should be able to issue clearances. Further, Local Security Assistants, also locally-recruited personnel, can be delegated the authority to grant security clearances when necessary. The policy was adjusted accordingly.

47. Because this issue was previously linked to security clearance, a question was raised about the status of the revision of the Basic Security in the Field training package. DSS confirmed that it was now in its final stages, but that there were some challenges with delivery dates from the contracted IT company. Nevertheless, DSS intended to launch the final Beta test at HQ within the next month and it was expected that the new BSITF could be available in English in the spring of 2011. Another question was raised about the requirement to complete the original BSITF and to re-certify. DSS confirmed that any personnel already certified in BSITF would not need to re-certify until the revised version was out (even if it has been more than 3 years since they were originally certified). Any personnel coming new into the system would need to certify in the original BSITF. One member requested that DSS provide something in writing to explain the current requirements for certification and re-certification pending the launch of the new BSITF.

c) Security Level System (SLS)

48. DSS briefed the meeting on the main issues with CRP 3(c), emphasizing that the document was meant as a part of the Security Policy Manual, and thus, only contained key policy issues surrounding the SLS and associated decision making (and was not meant to contain details on how the SLS model works). DSS noted that the other CRPs represented policy changes required with the abolishment of the Security Phase System (and not, technically, because of the launch of the SLS). Finally, DSS noted that most of the provisions of the proposed policy had already been approved by the CEB in other documents about the development and implementation of the SLS.

49. The Chair of the Medical Directors Network asked whether health hazards were considered as part of the assessment of “Hazards” in the Security Level System. He noted that the Brahimi report had implied that medical standards be included in security standards. In his view, although WHO was responsible for conducting the analysis of health hazards, the results of that analysis should nevertheless be included in the overall statement of threat at a certain location. He emphasized that when analyzing what level of risk exists, part of that assessment should include medical facilities and medical evacuation capabilities as risk mitigation. He noted that the only time that medical issues weighed in was through the ICSC methodology to determine the level of hardship duty stations. DSS clarified that medical hazards were not part of the “Hazard” assessment in the SLS because security professionals did not have the expertise to add value in
such an assessment. Other IASMN members noted that WHO issued a separate “medical rating”. and that in previous IASMN meetings it had been decided that the UNSMS not get involved in assessing medical hazards. The Chair recognized that further discussion within the UN system was needed to achieve better clarity on the link between the Medical services and the UNSMS.

50. Another member asked whether the section dealing with training requirements should not also apply to other mandatory security training such as SSAFE, where applicable. DSS noted that the SLS policy only included reference to B/ASITF because it had been specifically linked to the Security Phase System and that staff and managers needed clarity on how this would be dealt with now that the Security Phase System had been abolished. DSS noted that the issue of other mandatory security training was reflected in the policy on security clearance and TRIP.

51. Members asked about how the designation of “family/non-family” duty stations status would be made in the future. The Chair re-emphasized that the UNSMS would determine whether there are family or personnel restrictions in place due to security considerations and not use the terms “family or non-family” in designating such restrictions. He added that he hoped there would be better discrimination exercised in regards to how and when personnel or family members are evacuated. He recognized that one of the biggest issues faced was the presence of spouses at a duty station. He added that there are going to be places where there are no family restrictions due to security but where there may be other reasons, i.e. other restrictions that prevent families from being there. As such, a duty station could be designated “non-family” as defined by HR, but not have official “family restrictions” due to security reasons.

52. Some members asked if staff at large would have access to information about duty stations that have personnel or family restrictions (for security reasons). DSS confirmed that work is still ongoing to develop how information on personnel or family restrictions will be presented (e.g. a list showing all duty stations worldwide where there are restrictions). Another member cautioned that if staff depended only on DSS designations and the security clearance system to obtain information on duty stations, they may not get the full story about conditions at that location.

53. Judging by recent developments with the introduction of the SLS and with TRIP, the Chair concluded that security was serving as a catalyst for the rest of the UN to put in place better information management systems.

d) Applicability of UNSMS

54. DSS briefed the meeting that the proposed revision of the policy on applicability of the UNSMS was the result of the IASMN working group study done last year on various types of contracts in the UN system. The types of contracts were so numerous that the applicability policy had to focus on key commonalities. DSS noted that the underlying issue for applicability was the “direct contractual agreement” between an individual and an organization in the UNSMS. DSS also noted that the previous policy on applicability (in the Field Security Handbook) contained a Section B (“Assistance to Other Persons”) that had not been included in the proposed revision. Reference to “Assistance to Other Persons” would be covered under the chapter on “Crisis Management” in the Security Policy Manual.
55. It was recognized from the outset of the discussion that it was important to hear the views of the HR Network as well as OLA on this policy submission which attempted to define the scope and coverage of the UNSMS. The HR Network representative supported the document but emphasized that it must remain a living document and offered to take it back to the HR Network and revert with feedback. The staff federations sought clarification on why staff who were locally-recruited and paid by the hour were not covered by the UNSMS. DSS noted that this was a provision of the present policy in the FSH. OLA referenced the 1946 General Assembly Resolution that stipulated that all United Nations staff were “officials of the United Nations” for the purposes of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, except those who were “locally recruited and paid by the hour”. OLA believed that the category of ‘locally recruited and paid by the hour’ personnel was really a vanishing category. However, the Chair disagreed and one member of the IASMN attested to the fact that it regularly employed local personnel on hourly rates. Some questioned whether interns were included in the UNSMS and DSS confirmed that interns were covered because they had “a direct contractual agreement” with their organization.

56. Another member questioned whether it was the intention to cover only individual contractors rather than those employed by companies. The IASMN agreed that it was not the strategy of the UNSMS to cover employees of contracted companies. One organization informed the IASMN that it was making specific provisions in its contracts with companies that they must plan for and provide security for their employees. It was further noted that the employees of NGOs were in an identical situation to employees of companies. Because MOUs with NGOs would no longer be considered, (NGOs would be supported through “Saving Lives Together”), any references to NGOs who have signed a MOU with the UN system had been removed from the applicability policy.

57. The Chair disagreed that this proposed policy needed more elaborate debate or examination by the HR Network at this stage because it was imperative that guidance is provided to our colleagues in the field on this issue without delay (with the understanding that changes may come in the future).

**Discussion on the Security Policy Manual**

58. The Chair pointed out that in a very decentralized security system such as the UNSMS, trying to put in place a system that satisfies everyone was a challenge. In developing the *Security Policy Manual*, it was important to keep it at the policy level and not include too many guidelines and instructions on how to implement. Once the policies were written, the UNSMS could concentrate on formulating instructions and guidelines that are easier to adjust and update than broader policy.

59. The IASMN also debated the general availability of the *Field Security Handbook* and the *Security Policy Manual*. The IASMN was reminded that the FSH had been a restricted and confidential document. The IASMN agreed that maintaining the document as restricted was counterproductive, at the same time recognizing that some aspects should only be available to security professionals. Having a clear idea of who will read the SPM would be helpful for those writing policies.
60. Overall, there was support for making the Security Policy Manual (and the Field Security Handbook) available on a broader basis, with some parts having restricted access. It was also recognized that widely distributing the SPM would be a great opportunity to enhance the security culture within the UN. If we are to hold staff accountable to the Framework of Accountability, then there was an obligation to share the SPM with them. One participant cautioned that any widely distributed document would likely also be circulated to Member States and in this regard, issues relating to the relocation and possible evacuation of local staff could be very sensitive. Another member pointed out that should this document be circulated widely, consideration may need to be given to publishing it in the official languages of the organization.

**Recommendation**

61. The IASMN approved the following policies which will be reflected in the Security Policy Manual:

- Measures to Avoid Risk – Relocation and Evacuation and Alternative Work Modalities (CRP 3(a))
- Security Clearance and the Travel Request Information Process (TRIP) (CRP3 (b))
- Security Level System (SLS) (CRP 3 (c))
- Applicability of the United Nations Security Management System (CRP 3 (d))

62. The IASMN was informed of the reply that had been provided to UNIFIL in response to a request for clarification regarding security arrangements for citizens and/or residents of Lebanon who are eligible family members of UN internationally-recruited personnel stationed elsewhere, including in regards to evacuation/relocation. The IASMN agreed that the response should be developed further with a view to promulgating this on a broader level as a guideline.

63. The IASMN further considered the scope of dissemination of the Security Policy Manual taking into account that at present distribution of the Field Security Handbook is limited and agreed that in view of the fact that the Security Policy Manual had been designed from the beginning to be a much more widely shared document within the UN system and not designed only for security professionals, it may be circulated on a wider basis as an internal UN document, edited accordingly.

64. The IASMN noted that the HR Network was in the process of revising Annex I of the FSH and the IASMN requested that it review this once it is available.

**D. DSS Human Resources Review Project Update**

65. DSS provided to the IASMN an update and draft report of the Human Resources Review that had been conducted by a consultant with the promise that the complete report would be circulated once DSS had the chance to consider it thoroughly.

66. The IASMN was informed that the profile of the modern security professional had changed from what it was five years ago. Furthermore, DSS was seeking ways in which to reduce attrition
and keep security professionals motivated. Even though the Department had been successful in the substantive technical training provided to its staff and others, it has been less successful in terms of developing the “soft” skills of its staff and in addressing the issue of mobility in a systemic fashion (either between HQ and the field or inter-agency mobility). When the HR review had been discussed at the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Panama, the suggestion was made that perhaps IASMN working groups should be established to examine a number of the most critical areas, including profiling and recruitment, a common roster, deployment, training and development and mobility in order to move the results of the HR review forward in a practical and implementable manner.

67. In the ensuing discussion, members expressed their views on what the profile of a security officer should ideally look like and it was concluded that it should not necessarily include the requirement for a police or military background. A distinction needed to be made as to prior functions held in the military/police rather than accepting the fact that having served in either of those services in any capacity was a suitable qualification. It was noted that the traditional profile of a security officer had changed from what it was 5 years ago and it was suggested that a broader profile would now be more appropriate. DSS added that the profile of a security officer had recently been expanded to include those with corporate security and other corporate backgrounds, a wider range of skills, a minimum of two languages and a master’s degree in a relevant field.

68. One member asked how a manager who was managing risk from a line management perspective would be treated if interviewed for a security position to which DSS was of the opinion that the manager could make the first cut subject to a technical assessment and competency based interview.

69. The Chair made it very clear that having a security department that was populated only by military and police personnel was detrimental and that too much homogeneity was not being sought. What was being sought instead were bright, smart entry level candidates with international experience who could be trained to be security officers/advisers. He underlined that the best combination for the Department would in fact be one third ex-military, one third ex-police and one third composed of those falling outside those realms, emphasizing that an organization needs a pool of staff from which to fill mid or upper level positions. International security management was not the exclusive domain of those with military or police experience. Management skills are important and as such, the Chair was strongly opposed to staffing DSS only with those who had policy or military backgrounds.

70. DPKO/DFS informed the IASMN that two years ago it had adopted a broader definition of a security officer which encompassed non-military and non-police personnel. Many of those recruited who did not have a police or military background are now successfully working in the Field or for other organizations.

71. Another member noted the International Security Managers’ Association in London had discussed this issue and also reflected the same views - the Association, which was composed of the heads of security officials of Fortune 500 companies, were moving away from the old cliché
of policy, military, FBI and secret service officers to those with business skills and a university education in the security management area.

72. The representative of the HR Network reminded the meeting that during its 13th session in Vienna, the IASMN had been asked to what degree OHRM had been consulted on the issue of mobility as the HR Network had been working on a number of fronts to increase inter-agency mobility in general. She hoped that DSS’ effort would capitalize on what the HR Network was already doing. DSS confirmed that they had had discussions with OHRM on this issue.

73. Another member viewed the need to emphasize training, regardless of background, while another participant saw modern security management as a distinct profession focusing on the management of risk which was distinct from a police, military and even program management background. The Chair recognized that a working group on these matters was needed and the IASMN agreed that it was a fairly high priority to address these issues.

74. During the course of this discussion, it was pointed out by one member that the HLCM, in conducting an inventory of all its working groups, had excluded all the IASMN working groups and that this should not have been the case as many of the IASMN working group topics were cross-disciplinary and fed into other HLCM working groups.

75. The Chair informed participants that DSS was thinking of piloting initiatives arising out of DSS’ HR review, including on career planning and mobility, without waiting for the larger system to address these issues, as this could take quite some time. Before that however, it would be necessary to move forward with the full cooperation of OHRM. An offer was made to share with IASMN members previous pilot recommendations on mobility that had been devised in 2002. It was further suggested that inter-agency operability needed to be looked at in the context of all priorities and that a more flexible and expedient recruitment approach was needed to increase professionalism and promote career progression.

**Recommendations**

76. The IASMN agreed that high priority needed to be given to considering the recommendations emanating from DSS’ HR Review and that this may best be achieved through an IASMN working group.

**E. Budgetary Matters**

a) **Discussion paper: HLCM Finance and Budget Working Group on Safety and Security Costs**

77. The IASMN considered several discussion papers provided by the Chair of the Finance and Budget Network Working Group on Safety and Security Costs, noting the strong dialogue between the Finance and Budget Network and IASMN members as 23 organizations representing 92 percent of the jointly financed activities participated in the Working Group.
78. The Chair of the FBN WG recapped for IASMN members the genesis of the working group which had been tasked with carrying out a harmonized study to review four major tasks – 1. To carry out a study for a harmonized approach to include safety and security related resources in programme costs; 2. to review the current cost-sharing formula for the UNSMS with a view to ensuring that it was fair, transparent and based on objective parameters; 3. To conduct a review of the 2010-2011 budgetary requirements for the UNSMS (subsequently revised to a review of 2012/2013 information needs) and 4. To review any financial implications that may be linked to the new Security Level System. With the tenets, “no program without security” and “no security without resources” the assumptions were that the recommendations of the WG would support DSS operational effectiveness, maintain the current predictability and flexibility of DSS resources, and avoid reviewing the appropriateness of the budget and services provided by DSS as this work is done by other UN bodies. The Chair stressed the importance of having sufficient transparency when determining security costs. At the same time, it was also important that any recommendations arising from the FBN WG did not compromise operational effectiveness.

79. The FBN WG had produced an issues catalogue, surveyed specific problems for each organization, compiled a structured budget submission formula and timeline and examined the core concepts behind the JFA account, including who benefited from the arrangements in place. For the 2012/2013 process, the budgetary requirements of DSS were presented in the agreed template and format that had been circulated to the Steering Group meeting in Panama and subsequently endorsed. Some minor changes had come out of the Panama meeting and these had been incorporated into the submission prior to its circulation to the FBN. However, no final position had yet been agreed. It was intended that the FBN meet on 7 February 2011 to finalize its review. Additionally, the FBN Working Group on Security Costs is in the process of conducting its work, for which reviewing the cost sharing arrangement was a critical part.

80. IASMN members were informed of additional achievements of the WG to date which included the broad participation of both FBN and security focal personnel and a resulting format and content for the JFA budget that was very transparent. It was also confirmed that the WG was still open to any who wished to join from both the FBN and the IASMN.

81. The IASMN was further informed by DSS that the JFA budget had been endorsed by the Steering Group. One member requested an outline of the major strategic issues that were to be considered by the WG, to which it was confirmed that the WG would conduct its work with a variety of perspectives given the strong participation of persons from the financial, budgetary and security sides, as well as from the leadership of DSS.

82. The Chair pointed out that the budget of DSS was complex in that there were four components to funding the UNSMS, i.e. the regular budget, with much of that funding earmarked for the Safety and Security Services located at HQ’s and Regional Commissions, the Jointly-Financed Account, locally financed cost shared budgets at the country level and extra budgetary funding. He acknowledged that for the 2010/2011 budget, the consultative process had not taken place to the extent that the AFPOs would have wished nor was there sufficient clarity on what DSS was suggesting for inclusion. Now, however, he believed that the UNSMS was in a better place than it was last year in that there was much greater clarity on what is being provided for the money paid, why this is being provided and what is expected from it.
83. The Chair further explained that he was submitting a flat budget for 2012/2013 and that it was important to have mechanisms in place to consult with the AFPOs in advance. He was aware that many AFPOs were under financial constraints and that this may have an impact on the UNSMS. He emphasized the importance of DSS being able to provide value, and an examination of this began with DSS’ management review. Recognizing AFPOs have varying sizes and types of security programs, from small to large, it was imperative that DSS provides value and that this was done transparently. Pointing out that security is really carried out in the field, he noted that DSS’ HQ costs were only 2.8% of DSS’ entire budget, which was probably one of the smallest and leanest HQ budgets of any in the system. He agreed with some IASMN members who had called for the need to have a better understanding of the cost of and a better understanding of what the benefits were from MOSS and MORSS, as those costs were not really captured in these budgets.

84. One member was particularly concerned with the timeline regarding the next steps with respect to the JFA, pointing out that his organization’s budgetary process differed from that of the UN secretariat which caused significant problems as their fiscal year begins 1 July.

85. The Chair of the FBN WG had anticipated bringing new cost sharing arrangements to the FBN in early March 2011. However, he confirmed that this would not be possible as the FBN WG would have another meeting to explore options. Thereafter, the FBN would need to go before HLCM, ensuring adequate prior consultation with both the IASMN and DSS. Therefore it was likely that it would be the 22nd (fall) session of HLCM that would consider the conclusions of the FBN WG.

86. The Chair pointed out that he did not see that the new cost sharing methodology would be in place to affect the 2012/2013 submission. DSS confirmed that given the interest in the subject and the differing views, it would take time to reach agreement on a new cost shared formula, if this is even achievable. DSS advised therefore that we proceed using the existing methodology, especially as any change in the cost sharing formula was not likely to change the already identified costs.

87. One member was particularly concerned about his organization’s growth in the field and as headcounts had not yet been submitted, he was especially concerned about capturing accurate information.

88. The Chair offered that it was likely the local cost shared portion, which he did not believe was very high ($26 million globally in 2010), would decrease as DSS continues to gain further information about the costs at the country level. However, he did recognize that the cost of locally funded budgets as compared with the cost for MOSS and MORSS did warrant further examination as the latter costs needed to brought under control as these were likely to have a larger impact on locally cost shared budgets. He also confirmed that any AFP wishing to examine those costs could do so anytime as DSS had recently developed an online tool to which all the security focal points have access.
89. While one member agreed with this, he was still concerned about the growth in local budgets and asked whether a freeze on these might be considered. The Chair responded that he could not guarantee a freeze as these were decided at the country level. For the time being, he would defer to the assessments made by the DOs and SMTs in country, although it was always an option that DSS HQ could challenge the decision put forth by the SMT. It was pointed out that WHO had submitted a paper for this session of the IASMN which called for tightening up the process for MOSS approval.

90. One member suggested it might be helpful to have milestones earmarked for the work of the FBN WG. Others commended the work of the FBN WG and DSS and emphasized the need for consultation and transparency, especially as big challenges lay ahead in terms of security.

91. The Chair of the FBN WG assured the IASMN that at the next meeting of the FBN WG it would be the intention to come up with “marker dates”. DSS clarified that the JFA budget would be presented to ACABQ mid-April and as such it needed to be submitted to OPPBA six weeks before that. He noted that the FBN VTC would be held on 7 February, and that there would then be one to two weeks maximum to incorporate any changes before the budget is finalized within the UN Controller’s office.

**Recommendation:**

92. The IASMN welcomed the briefing by the Chair of the HLCM Finance and Budget Network Working Group on Safety and Security Costs on the progress made by the Working Group so far.

93. The IASMN noted that an update of the Working Group activities would be presented to the FB Network at its next session in February 2011, with recommendations likely to be presented at the following session. The final proposals of the FBN would be submitted to HLCM at its 22nd session (Fall 2011).

**b) Biennium Budget for 2012-2013 Jointly Financed Account**

94. DSS presented the JFA budget and explained to IASMN members that it was its intention to maintain zero growth but to implement a number of changes within its existing structure that had been decided upon after an evaluation of present staffing resources. The purpose was to streamline rather than increase resources; to streamline operations in the field by recognizing the value of upgrading positions at the top in a handful of countries with special needs, while at the same time downgrading a number of positions so as to increase the number of “entry” level positions, i.e. changing the staffing table by downgrading P4 to P3 and P3 posts to P2 and reclassifying a P5 to D1 resulting in a zero sum game.

95. DSS also explained to the IASMN the differences caused by financial adjustments made to take into account the high vacancy rate at the beginning of 2010 after the GA approved the new posts as well. Thus, budgeting practices in the UN sometimes distort the figures which resulted in what appeared to indicate a growth in resources, but was in reality not. It was also explained that given the recent approval by the General Assembly of the harmonization of conditions of
service, DSS field staff will most probably in the near future move over from being administered by UNDP to being administered by the DSS Executive Office. Therefore, the budget was further adjusted to reflect a reduction in UNDP administrative costs (noting that the current MOU with UNDP would need to be renegotiated).

96. Additionally, IASMN members were presented with a breakdown of activities for the two main areas of DSS funded through the JFA – the Division of Regional Operations and the Field Service Support Services, with travel projections adjusted accordingly. There was a table available to clearly show field operations by country.

97. DSS further explained that at UN HQ, its control on the locally cost shared budget which stands at 26.9million is virtually nonexistent as it is the SMT that decides on these budgets. One member was of the opinion that DSS should not refer to zero growth but rather minimum growth given the increase caused by the 14% vacancy rate used by the UN’s Budget Division. DSS confirmed that this was indeed true, but noted that if in actuality all the new posts had been filled in January 2010, the budget would truly reflect zero growth as no new resources were being requested.

98. While UNDP agreed to the need for renegotiating an MOU with DSS, it was hoped that a more realistic administrative fee could be negotiated that would truly reflect a better rate of costs incurred in managing DSS staff. It was also noted that there would be a 5 year transition period (i.e. in 2016), before conditions of service were truly harmonized across the UN system and that this change would only reflect international and not locally recruited staff nor would it affect services provided for DSS at the local level. As such, the DSS management of its international staff would not necessarily be fully operative in 2011 or indeed 2012.

99. UNDP further proposed that the cost sharing formula required re-examination and asked the Chair of the FBN if the WG considered how costs were shared and headcounts were based. He believed that the more relevant discussion that needed to be had was what was paid for by the UN as part of its regular budget support by DSS and what was paid for by the agencies. Doubts were expressed about being able to achieve a result on this prior to the 2012 – 2013 budget period. The point was also made that with the creation of UN Women as a new agency in the UN system, there was a need to bring that organization into the IASMN and thus the cost sharing budget.

100. DSS believed that it would be unwise to revert to the GA and ACABQ to request an increase in the share of the regular budget to fund services which were exclusively in support of the UN system as a whole. In terms of staffing in the DSS’ Executive Office, while acknowledging there will be a five year transition, nevertheless from July 2011 there would be a need for the EO to handle new recruits coming on board under new terms and conditions, as well as those who are reassigned to new duty stations whereby the reassignment would result in these staff being transitioned to the new system. Given that there was normally a two to four year rotation period, by the middle of 2013, the vast majority of DSS staff would fall under the new conditions of service. Furthermore, DSS’ EO had already been approached by the Assistant Secretary-General for the UN secretariat’s Office of Human Resources (OHRM) regarding the transition of DSS field staff from UNDP to UN Secretariat contracts. In view of this, it was
argued that the inclusion of a proposal to include additional staff in the EO to manage the HR function was indeed prudent.

101. Turning to the cost sharing formula, the Chair of the FBN WG reiterated that the WG has been tasked with looking into this. It seemed unlikely that the cost-sharing formula would change for the 2012/2013 budget. However, it was clarified that within the current arrangement, it had been raised in the FBN and will be further discussed on 7 February that it might be more appropriate for some elements currently included under the JFA to be included under the regular budget e.g. administrative costs paid to UNDP to support the DSS field offices.

102. One member made the point that the budget submission should include an indication of the current resources allocated to DSS and how they have been used in this biennium. This should then be compared with the submission for the next biennium so it can be clearly seen where activities can be improved. It was argued that the submission should reflect expected outcomes of budget proposals as it will be impossible to convince Member States to go for any increase. On this point, it was also stated that the P5 to D1 reclassification needed further justification and explanation, as well as an indication of expected outcomes. It was not clear why there was a need to reclassify a P4 to a P5 post in TRU. It was well understood that DSS wished to attract and retain qualified persons but expected outcomes could not be clearly seen from this budget submission and it was felt that if DSS makes such proposals then what is expected from this needs to be clearly explained. DSS explained that the budget did include expected outcomes and deliverables and that it was not possible to include the extremely detailed justifications in the actual budget documents to enable the submission to remain manageable but that the complete and detailed justifications behind any requests for change (such as the reclassifications) are available should they be requested. Regarding the upgrading of a post from P5 to D1, one member asked whether these would be open to a competitive recruitment process. DSS confirmed this would be the case.

103. The suggestion was also made that CSAs should be better versed in how they run their local budgets. DSS agreed that CSAs as managers should be expected to be familiar with the budget process and management to some extent in order to maintain sufficient oversight. On the question of reclassification of P5s to D1s in the field, it was explained that an additional response on this issue had already been provided to the FBN network in writing. The IASMN was further reminded that the upgrading of CSA posts had been discussed and agreed to at the 13th session of the IASMN in Vienna in 2010, citing the results of DPKO/DFS’ benchmarking study. The point was further made that even though DSS had been quite successful in terms of staff development up to now, in the area of security not enough attention had been paid to developing the soft skills of its staff, e.g. budget, HR, presentation and negotiation skills - and that this will certainly be something to be addressed over the next 12 to 24 months.

104. Another member asked how the rotation of D1 officers would be handled, considering that most D1 positions were proposed in locations that are currently designated as non family duty stations. As such, it was also asked if the intention was to maintain P5 officers with a Special Post Allowance (SPA) to D1 in order that they may continue to rotate into other positions. DSS pointed out that there are two schools of thought on this particular issue – that some believe staff be given the opportunity to compete for posts at the D1 level and retain that level from thereon in
which does present difficulties in terms of rotation, while others believe that it would be more practical to grant an SPA for the period the staff member encumbered that particular post. There were pros and cons to both and conclusions had not yet been reached on how this particular aspect would be managed. Discussions were ongoing.

105. Returning to the issue of the cost shared budget, another member made the point that it would be irresponsible to micromanage the field by requiring approval of the local cost shared budget at HQ and that requirements were decided upon in the field, on the basis of an SRA and with the concurrence of DO and members of the SMT. The better option would be to have more regular attendance by AFPOs on the SMT so they could participate in deliberations, particularly when local cost sharing was being discussed.

106. One member stated that it would be impossible to submit the JFA budget to the Controller by the end of February 2011 unless agreement was reached on certain basic elements, for example there should not be discussions on the internal elements of the budget (such as reclassifications) but there should be a discussion on how the JFA could be reduced in real and nominal terms and include a provision for surge if the need arises. This would then provide the savings the AFPOs were looking for. DSS pointed out that there was not enough time to discuss and agree upon such mechanisms on for example, how surge would work and this could also leave DSS and the AFPOs vulnerable to not having sufficient resources to fund any surge requirements. It was pointed out that DSS had tried in the past to present to the GA proposals for emergency funding relating to surge requirements (A/63/605) but that had failed. Essentially it was late in the day to discuss any drastic changes in how to do business. Therefore it was proposed that these were issues to tackle for the future - it was not realistic to do so for the 2012/2013 budget.

107. The Chair of the FBN WG raised the issue of administrative costs paid by the JFA, since the GA resolution creating DSS seemed to indicate that such costs should be paid by the Regular Budget. He indicated that this issue would be discussed at the FBN meeting in February, but that the Controllers’ office would likely resist the transfer of costs from the JFA to the Regular Budget. Another member stated that since the establishment of UNSECOORD and DSS, the security needs have increased and in the majority of cases, resources once allocated in high risk dusty stations remained, even after the situation had returned to normal. Given the ongoing financial constraints, it was necessary to carefully review what can be done with less. In this context, the member requested that the next budget (2014-2015) be reviewed based on the actual operational needs of duty stations, the level of threats and staff presence. The Chair pointed out that he acknowledged that there was not as much transparency as he would like. He also stated that there would be more information put on the UNSMIN website, e.g. how many security officers we have, what is the real threat, how many locations there are, etc. DSS was not fully there yet but had started putting all the tools in place to do those things. He reminded the IASMN that the question of how much the JFA can afford was the result of this whole consultative process. He acknowledged that DSS was late in conducting the consultative process for the 2010/2011 budget submission and reiterated that the current JFA budget proposal is flat, that DSS had conducted a better budget analysis this time around and that the flat budget proposal should go ahead, but if AFPOs cannot afford that then it would be important to know this.
108. The Chair pointed out that the 2010/2011 budget submission focused on significant weaknesses in the UNSMS, e.g. there needed to be better threat analysis so it had been proposed that there be Security Information Operation Centers (SIOCs) in 5 locations. He emphasized however that this was just the beginning of the process and that it would take at least a year for the newly staffed SIOCs to really understand what is going on. For the 2012/2013 budget, everyone’s wish list could have been succumbed to but cognizant of the budget climate we are in, it was decided not to request new positions. Even though it was decided to maintain the same budget levels, at the same time, it was necessary to request some changes in order to better manage the department. DSS had examined the DPKO/DFS benchmarking review and realized it had no ‘bank’ of D1s. DSS also realized that to foster mobility, all candidates from the AFPOs should be considered as internal candidates and he would work towards this. He stressed that essentially what is being asked for in the 2012/2013 budget would provide the department with the ability to manage the resources it already has. He emphasized that we should not go backwards with security budgets but we must have the ability to manage within the resources provided. New positions were not being created and furthermore, costs would be offset by lowering the entry level positions from P4 to P3 and P3 to P2. There was a need to reprioritize resources which was possible because there were a tremendous amount of places that are quite secure. He was committed to fighting for a flat budget for 2012 - 2013.

109. Turning again to the issue of reclassifications, another member asserted that this needed to be based on operational decisions and not to promote people. The IASMN was also reminded that the DPKO/DFS benchmark study was available. It had originally been conducted as a “mission security section review” in accordance with ICSC and OHRM job classification standards. Further, the study revealed that the principal rationale for upgrading positions to D1 was that those positions had been under graded for many years, so the proposals for a number of upgradings from P5 to D1 rested on ensuring equal pay for equal work.

110. Another member reminded the meeting that HLCM had pushed budget issues onto the IASMN as that body did not have the technical expertise to consider the budget adequately from the vantage point of assessing the technical security standards required by the UNSMS. It was recommended that the IASMN tables the endorsement of the budget with the understanding that all upgrading of posts are to be handled within the managed HR system of the UN.

111. It was pointed out by another member that the real problem did not rest with whether the budget met security requirements but whether AFPOs could afford the budget. It was suggested therefore that decisions on financial resources be left to HLCM and another member suggested that the IASMN recommend to the HLCM that the budget be endorsed as is.

112. The Chair confirmed that he would go to the HLCM but needed to know he had strong IASMN support for the budget and in making this point, referenced the increasing security challenges the UN system faces in a number of high risk locations. SFPs were asked to provide comments to their respective budget offices within the next 7 to 10 days.

**Recommendations:**
113. The IASMN reviewed and endorsed the substance of the biennium budget report for the 2012-2013 Jointly Financed Account that reflected in general inputs by IASMN members and the comments of the Finance and Budget Network members. It was noted that the IASMN reviews the budget from an operational point of view while the Finance and Budget Network considers it mainly from a perspective of affordability and appropriateness of funding.

114. The IASMN appreciated the increased transparency and results-based elements in the report and requested to continue developing them further in order to provide a clear picture concerning the use of the financial resources and expected outcome. In this context, the IASMN suggested that, in future, the budget submissions from DSS should contain information concerning the utilization of the financial resources in the current biennium budget and be based on a thorough review of the security needs of duty stations before it is submitted for consideration.

c) Funding Mechanisms for Emergency Response

115. DSS was seeking a means by which to fund unanticipated emergency requirements. The biggest problem was in terms of staffing where at present persons were surged from countries that could let individuals go. DSS also received support from the IASMN and in particular DPKO/DFS who also lent staff for a period of time to respond to emergencies on the ground. However, it was recognized this only worked for short-term emergency situations, but not for longer term emergencies, e.g. the flooding in Pakistan, where it was necessary to commit surge officers for up to 12 months. Although this has been talked about for a number of years, it was now time for the IASMN to come up with mechanisms to deal with this issue.

116. The Chair explained that the whole issue of seeking means for emergency funding arose after Pakistan. He informed the IASMN that any effort to go forward to obtain GA approval for contingency funding in the present economic climate would be without result. The idea of money being stockpiled until an emergency arises would also not sit well with anyone. He did emphasize that more can be done jointly than individually but that any joint response in the past had not been successful. There was no easy answer and perhaps there was a need to consider a working group to examine this issue more closely to see how everyone can best work together in these types of situations.

117. Pointing to the frustration evident in responding to any emergency, another member informed the meeting that there were some existing mechanisms, such as the CERF where financial and HR policies allowed more flexibility in times of crisis. This idea plus others could be brought to a working group.

Recommendation:

118. The IASMN decided that this issue required further examination. DSS will provide further proposals and analysis in this regard.

F. Standard Country Cost-Shared Budget
119. At the outset of this discussion, the Chair pointed out that about $26 million was being spent by all AFPOs per annum on country cost shared budgets. Although country cost shared budgets are voted upon by the SMTs, in some cases there was no mechanism in place for HQ approval. Only if the amount of the budget exceeded $150,000 would it need to come to DSS for review. However, some believed that the processes that should be triggered when this cap was exceeded were not being fully respected and it was hoped that compliance evaluation missions could also look at how money was being spent on a local level.

120. One member repeated his earlier caution against micro managing local cost shared budgets, pointing out that sometimes the SMT was often the only forum where issues other than security were discussed. Another member believed this was simply a matter of ensuring the requisite oversight at the HQ level. The Representative of the FBN complemented DSS on the progress made with respect to the locally cost shared budget upload facility which reflected a commitment to transparency and would facilitate the review of the JFA budget country allocations. UNDP reminded members that many organizations were still very late with payment.

121. The Chairman confirmed that in house compliance was being conducted on a number of issues at present and acknowledged that DSS did not carry out enough compliance missions nor were they adequately resourced. He added that although the intent was not to micro manage, there was still a need to recognize when someone had gone over the $150,000 limit and why.

Recommendation:

122. The IASMN noted the information provided by DSS and the progress made in the application of the approved standards for local cost sharing and recommended that a mechanism to provide for oversight and comparison of local costs between duty stations be established.

123. Furthermore, the IASMN reiterated its recommendation from its 13th session whereby it endorsed the proposed standard format for the country level security cost-shared budget with a view to reviewing this format in future IASMN meetings, that DSS review the existing Operational Guidelines on this issue and ensure that CSAs/SAs present timely submissions and in so doing, not exceed the budgetary limits specified and that the budget be circulated in country by 1 October, with billing issued on 15 November and payments to UNDP received no later than 1 March.

G. Premises Vulnerability Questionnaire Update and Impact on UN Premises Safety and Security Policy

124. Recognizing that the HLCM at its 21st session would need to be provided with an update on the results of the PVQ and the impact this might have on the UN Premises Policy, the IASMN was provided with information on the current status of the PVQ exercise.

125. One member cited the need for more clarity in filling out the questionnaires in order to make these more relevant, especially to high risk areas. Another suggested that the results of the questionnaire could prove to be a valuable tool in preparing a business case for management for improved premises, while another member pointed to the difficulties with accessing the
information generated by the PVQ and asked who would have access to this information. The fact that non security personnel were sometimes entering data into the system was also flagged as a problem.

126. DSS hoped that the PVQ results would aid in indicating how much it would cost for AFPOs to move premises if needed and confirmed that in view of the fact that some 6,000 persons could enter the PVQ database, it was not possible to quickly determine access rights. Further work was needed, in close collaboration with DRO, to ensure that proper rights were assigned to the proper persons. The Chair recognized the sensitivity of this issue and informed the IASMN that some AFPOs had participated in the PVQ exercise with the understanding that this information would be tightly held. The whole point of the exercise was to derive baseline information that had never been gathered before about the UN system. Now that this information was available, there was a need to address how it was dealt with and what was done with it. He pointed out that there was a difference between real estate issues which were long term issues, entailing a five to ten year process and leasing issues which usually lasted for a shorter period. Essentially, AFPOs would need to adopt their own individual approaches in adapting the data.

127. Recognizing that this was the first time there had been any measurement of the vulnerability of UN properties and that the information gathered to date was not fully comprehensive, it was suggested that a small working group be convened to study the results of the PVQ further. There was a need to give special attention to premises in higher vulnerability and higher threat areas that are in the greatest danger due to the regularity of attacks. Thought needed to be given overall to how to use scarce resources to the maximum advantage.

128. One member wished to know what process was being used to identify regional office premises, while another emphasized the need to maintain a broad view in examining premises and wished to see policy guidelines and a reasonably practical tool that can be developed to address the vulnerability of offices. It was also necessary to focus on offices outside capital cities.

129. The Chair suggested that at some point joint guidelines and common measures, e.g. the need for shatter proof film, might be developed by a working group. At the same time, it was questioned whether common measures could even be feasible.

130. Two further suggestions were made, i.e. that the issue of premises be linked to occupational health and safety policies and that risks from earthquakes also be considered.

**Recommendation**

131. The IASMN took note of the update on the results of the PVQ questionnaire and will examine this, as well as the draft UN Premises Safety and Security Policy at the working group level.

**H. Safety and Security Services Update applicable to the United Nations**

**a) Revised Use of Force Policy**
132. In introducing this policy, the Chair explained that while there were many versions of a Use of Force Policy in the UN, for example, in DPKO, there did not exist any universal use of force policy in place to govern the use of weapons by UN civilian security components. The Chair, as USG of DSS could not accept that a uniform policy did not exist. As such, the Safety and Security services of DSS had reviewed all current Use of Force policies that were available and worked with some governments that had good use of force policies in place in order to develop a single Use of Force policy for the UN. The need for the highest standard in the world for the use of deadly force and to set the standards for others was stressed. The final version of the Use of Force policy had been vetted with OLA and passed through OHCHR quite a few times in order to ensure that there is an easily understandable UoF policy that meets the highest standards required. Decisions to use a weapon and apply use of deadly force should not be left to persons to figure out in limbo. Direction was required. Further, security officers should be required to state this policy which needed to be absolutely unambiguous, defendable and in line with best policies worldwide.

133. There was only one question mark and that referred to the fact that some Member States have Use of Force policies that require firing a warning shot. The Chair made very clear that he would not entertain the UN having to fire a warning shot before using deadly force. He also added that if he did not have agreement in the IASMN on adopting the UoF policy for the UNSMS, that he would nevertheless enforce this within DSS. He believed that it was antiquated to reference the need to fire a warning shot and that there had been long discussions in the IASMN Steering Group about this very subject. In developing the present policy, it was found that certain countries had rules and regulations in place that did not spell out compliance with firing a warning shot nor did any alternatives exist. It was also emphasized that there was a clear difference between a warning and using a bullet as a warning.

134. IASMN members welcomed this policy as it served to address a long standing issue about standards applicable throughout the entire UN, especially as there were a lot of officers moving between duty stations who were also coming into service bringing with them their own national standards. This policy was needed to avoid any confusion and it was hoped it would be rolled out as soon as possible.

Recommendation:

135. The IASMN approved the Use of Force Policy for the UNSMS.

b) Weapons Manual

136. The Chief of DSS’ Safety and Security Services informed IASMN members that the Weapons Manual was expected for the next regular session of the IASMN.

Recommendation:

137. The IASMN took note of the work done to date to produce a UN Weapons Manual that is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2011.
c) Close Protection Syllabus and Training

138. The Chair requested the IASMN to approve a minimum standard of training for close protection officers. The IASMN was informed that presently there were in excess of 400 armed UN staff who can be called upon to carry out close protection duties. However, none had attained the same single standard. DSS ran its curriculum and syllabus that had been developed for CP training by the US State Department and received overwhelming support. A pilot course was conducted in March 2010 and since then there had been two additional courses (3 in total with 37 professionals attending and 27 now trained to a global best practices standard). The standard required pre-testing and a pass or fail course evaluated by a number of instructors, followed by a summary report on each individual to assess whether they had met the standard. Instructors needed to requalify and then be tested in seven different specialist categories. The program clearly supported professionalizing close protection.

139. The Chair added that at present there is a high degree of variability when it comes to the levels of close protection training. Existing CP officers have either received very high levels of training or no training at all. There was no UN curriculum. Hence, the IASMN was requested, not to vet the existing syllabus and curriculum, but to approve the concept that anyone carrying out close protection for the UN needed to meet at least a minimum level of training. He reminded IASMN members that they had the opportunity to set a policy so that perhaps in four years this may be made mandatory.

140. One member pointed to the need to distinguish between new persons coming in and those who were already in the system. The Chair confirmed that certificates would be revalidated after a certain period of time and that he would like to see all CP officers rolled through the program as soon as possible to balance the new recruits with already established close protection officers. The Chair also confirmed this would be applicable to civilians (not soldiers) working for peacekeeping missions who were carrying out CP duties and that DPKO was fully on board with this.

141. Addressing the issue of whether Member States that provide close protection services would also be subject to CP training, the Chair pointed out that as Member State support for close protection was examined it was natural to also examine whether any close protection officers provided should also be trained to this standard. In future, it would be good to see Member States providing close protection personnel who meet the minimum requirements. It was further suggested that this issue be addressed in any policy developed regarding private security companies.

Recommendation:

142. The IASMN fully supported that there should be a single UN standard in place for the training of close protection officers and recommended that all UN system Close Protection officers be fully certified to the UNDSS specified standard within four years.

I. Saving Lives Together (SLT) Update
143. The IASMN had approved a paper in 2006 entitled “Saving Lives Together” which primarily dealt with ways in which the humanitarian community could better cooperate on security issues, such as 1) sharing information and lessons already learnt on how to protect staff, 2) discussing risk tolerance and risk-benefit analysis, 3) advising IASC Principals how to advocate with governments on their protection responsibilities, 4) supporting national staff and 5) supporting victims and their families, among other issues”. While the attempt in 2006 to reinforce UN and NGO security collaboration that led to the SLT initiative was successful in some countries, in many others it had never been fully implemented as it did not actually prescribe responsibility for SLT implementation.

144. Recognizing that engagement between the UN, NGOs and INGOs in the field continues to be a major operational reality, the IASC Steering Group on Security (SGS), that brought together UN and non-UN partners under the auspices of the IASC, determined that a revision of the Saving Lives Together Framework would be the most viable means of ensuring and reinforcing interoperability between all actors.

145. IASMN Members and DSS played a key role in the deliberations of the SGS that lead to the substantial revision of SLT in 2010 which supports a practical hands-on approach with clear measurable roles for all parties. The IASMN was requested to consider the revised SLT together with the report on the revision of SLT, as well as the SLT proposal that had been presented at the 13th session of IASMN and were invited to support this initiative and to contribute to the activities in support of the IASC SGS and the revised “Saving Lives Together”.

146. The Chair pointed out that DSS HQ maintains daily liaison with 80 NGO focal points as well as a growing roster of NGO focal points in the field. Further, the SLT is the only GA endorsed framework for this type of collaboration and addresses situations of armed conflict as well as natural disasters.

147. While one member noted the fact that conceptually SLT was working well and that there was an increased reliance on implementing partners to deliver, one concern was about the perception about the level of support to NGOs and the need to manage expectations on the part of NGOs, e.g. as seen in one particular case where NGOs sought to be included in the UN’s evacuation plans.

148. Several organizations strongly supported this initiative and saw this as embodying an attitude very different from years ago. The information sharing aspect of SLT supported NGOs helping themselves. At the same time, the UN was also drawing a benefit from this. A few members believed it was important that DSS’ security officers on the ground were properly informed of this initiative and armed with guidance on what information would be permissible to share and what was not. Another member pointed to the importance for NGOs to understand what their responsibilities were while another stressed that NGOs should also be utilized for their fund raising abilities.

149. The Chair pointed out that part of the SIOCs and the independent analyst’s role was to provide information for NGOs, particularly in cases where rapid deployment was needed. He
added that so far, some $1.8 million had been donated to support this initiative and at least that much would be needed next year. During 2011/2012 it was imperative to prove the value of this concept in order to ensure that funds would still be available.

150. The discussion turned to the issue of the feasibility of funding an NGO liaison officer within DSS to support this initiative. A proposal was endorsed by the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting in Panama that the post of an NGO Liaison/SLT Coordinator be funded by reclassifying a P.4 post provided for in the JFA account to the P.5 level. TORs for this post were provided to IASMN members and presented under cover of agenda item 5(b): Biennium Budget for the 2012-2013 Jointly Financed Account. It was explained that all SLT officers were presently funded through extra-budgetary funds. It was also pointed out that as major attacks on humanitarians rise, contributions for security in specific field locations unfortunately decreased despite the fact that there was a great benefit to the overall programs of the UN in that NGOs often delivered the product on behalf of programs. DSS needed therefore to improve its efforts on resource mobilization.

151. Another issue raised in connection with SLT was the recent recruitment of analysts’ positions to support the NGO capacity in local SIOCs. DSS explained that the recruitment process for those posts had been handled through the use of existing rosters. One member, expressing particular concern that there be open hiring for such positions, suggested that in future, such vacancies be shared among the AFPOs. Means also needed to be found to interface with the NGO community on such vacancies as the types of persons to be recruited should be those who understand and can work with the NGO community. DSS confirmed that it would continue to report back to the IASMN on the implementation of SLT.

Recommendation:

152. The IASMN noted the revisions to Saving Lives Together and the progress made so far and expressed continuing support for the program.

153. The IASMN further noted the TORs for an NGO Liaison/SLT Coordinator.

J. Standardization of MOUs

154. The report of the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Florence in January 2008, under the heading "MOU with organizations who want to join the UNSMS" noted that "... a number of organizations expressed interest in signing a MOU to join the UNSMS. The Steering Group agreed unanimously that no more MOUs should be signed with organizations seeking to join the UNSMS, considering the current capacity of DSS."

155. Further, the report of the IASMN Steering Group meeting in Lyon in December 2009, under the heading of “Discussion of Moratorium on new MOUs for Organizations wishing to be included in UN Security Arrangements” noted that the Steering Group discussed “lifting the moratorium on new Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with Organizations wishing to be included in UN security arrangements. Based on various factors, the moratorium will remain in effect for both local and global MOUs for the next 12 months.”
156. Acknowledging the unanimous agreement within the IASMN that no new MOUs regarding coordination of security arrangements be signed, four (4) Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) that have existing MOUs wished to revise the wording and content of their MOU to properly reflect changes in the UNSMS. The four (4) IGOs were the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

157. Accordingly, for the 14th session of IASMN, DSS produced a revised template for the MOU that was contained in Addendum 1 of Annex P of the Field Security Handbook. The revision was based on feedback from those IGOs, as well as the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). The IASMN was also informed that not only could the template be adjusted to reflect specific needs of any one of the four IGOs cited above, but it could also serve as a baseline template for any future MOUs and as such it should be included in the Security Policy Manual.

158. In considering the revised template, it was noted that since the last version of the MOU had been designed, there had been major changes in the UNSMS. In addition, while it was confirmed that the term intergovernmental organizations also applied to regional organizations such as the EU, the question was raised as to whether regional organizations should or should not become part of the IASMN.

159. The Chair requested guidance from the IASMN on how to handle the current moratorium on entering into MOUs for non UN IGOs. One member pointed out that membership of the IASMN had more to do with assessing how the burden of additional costs would be distributed rather than on a political decision. More partners meant additional resources. At present, there were simply not enough resources to take on more. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that the current moratorium on MOUs brought undesired effects and that perhaps there was a need to revise the MOU or at least parts of it.

160. The IASMN was reminded that the moratorium on MOUs was enforced at a time when DSS was a very new department and when its capacity on the ground was very limited. At that time, there were questions from both local and international NGOs about joining the UNSMS. It was suggested that the time was perhaps right for opening up the scope of this issue to also consider INGOs and local NGOs and for the IASMN to perhaps consider two kinds of partnerships – a regular partnership, i.e. a regular MOU for IGOs and another one for the local level, especially for those who are unofficial implementing partners.

161. Caution was expressed about the implications MOUs with NGOs could have on the UN, as some NGOs were viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Another member questioned why the IASMN should or would accept additional members as there was no benefit or added value in doing so. Instead, there should be a focus on expanding on the SLT to enhance security collaboration with INGOs.

162. It was suggested by another that while it would be a good idea to have new members, proper mechanisms and procedures should be put in place for this. Perhaps new members could hold observer status first, and then membership can be decided upon after that.
163. Another member pointed out that in several country offices, separate arrangements/agreements had been made with IGOS or other governmental organizations. Although more data would be needed, he was not in favour of expanding the membership especially if efforts were being made to keep budget costs down. Yet another member suggested that perhaps an overview of the pros and cons of accepting new members could be drawn up and discussed at the next IASMN. The impact on the system needed to be considered and an application process instituted.

164. The Chair suggested that this could be raised at the next IASMN Steering Group meeting where consensus for moving beyond the moratorium could be sought. For local INGOs, he acknowledged that there existed the SLT initiative. He reminded participants that this discussion was focused only on IGO membership in IASMN. One member asked if SMTs would be required to sign local MOUs to which the Chair responded that it would be important to draw distinctions – to have specific MOUs about what services were going to be provided. The meeting was also reminded that at the IASMN meeting in London, the IASMN had drawn a line about what the UN was truly responsible for and what an NGO had to be responsible for. A year and a half ago, there were no more MOUs at the local level and SLT was becoming more robust and well funded. The whole point was about providing advice and counsel on best practices. The UN could not take the responsibility for doing for others what it could not do for itself. Therefore, there was a need for clarity about lines of responsibility.

**Recommendation:**

165. The IASMN approved a revised MOU template to replace the sample MOU in Addendum I of Annex P of the *Field Security Handbook* (to become part of the *Security Policy Manual*), and at the same time confirmed that the moratorium on entering into additional MOUs is still in force. However, the IASMN agreed that the moratorium would be further reviewed at the next meeting of the Steering Group in May 2011.

**K. Country MOSS Table Endorsement Process**

166. WHO presented a paper that proposed modifications to the MOSS approval process in order to ensure that IASMN member organizations are encouraged to comment at the headquarters level and that comments made are integral to the shaping of the country MOSS table. The revised process would also open the way for a more agile approval of those proposals that are not subject to objections, clarifications or comments. Recent episodes had indicated the importance of reviewing the MOSS approval process with the intention of ensuring the best possible integration of the inputs by different actors. Simultaneously, it was also acknowledged that, in numerous cases, the approval of MOSS proposals was a very straightforward process that should, as much as possible, be expedited.

167. DSS presented to IASMN members an overview of the current procedure for MOSS and MORSS approval, i.e. the submission, supported by the SMT was considered by the DSS regional desks and then by the Director, DRO. WHO’s proposal intended to fix a loophole in the process by allowing the Desk Chief more authority to more rigorously review requests.
168. In the ensuing discussion, there was some criticism of the criteria/needs elaborated in some MOSS/MORSS requests which was seen by some as going beyond minimum requirements. This was of particular concern as the cost of MOSS and MORSS was increasing and it was suggested that there needed to be a control mechanism in place to determine baseline costs and to tighten the way in which comments were sent back to the field. It was also suggested that before any request was endorsed by the Desks that the most recent security risk assessment be made available on the UNSMIN website.

169. One member asked how a safety requirement was distinguished from a security requirement, e.g. an air purifier. Another, believed, recalling that the initial review period had been one month, that the present review period of 10 days was not enough time in which to review requests in light of limited agency capacity. Preference for a longer review period was expressed. Another member stated that there was a difference between a minimum standard and a good idea and he hoped there could be a strong effort to train security officers on setting minimum standards and advising on best practices. It was pointed out that often country representatives would give into peer pressure to agree on a submission.

170. DSS confirmed that MOSS approval was often a difficult and contentious process and explained how the Desks received the request from the SMT, reviewed this and examined whether minimum measures were justified by an SRA. If so, then the request would be signed off by the Director, DRO. If the Desks did not believe the request was justified, they would revert requesting further justification. The whole process could take months and the Desks were constantly walking a fine line between trying not to second guess the field and determining what was accurate. For MORSS, the Desk would also look at the SIRS database to see how many incidents of home invasions there had been. However, even SIRS could not provide an accurate description of the impact of home invasions on the international community. The Desks would try to practice good vetting, but in the end it would come down to whose judgement was correct.

171. The Chair, while agreeing with WHO’s proposal, did not believe that the proposal went far enough to address the real issue which was the spiralling costs of MOSS and MORSS. There was a need therefore to hire persons with accounting backgrounds to gather the necessary statistics to ascertain what we are paying, how much per person, whether that is associated to higher risk countries or not and whether it is off the charts in some places. A more rigorous methodology was needed and perhaps this issue needed to be examined once every 3 to 5 years.

172. It was questioned whether the current MOSS approval process was not contradictory in a decentralized UNSMS and asked at what point the SFPs should be involved and whether DOs should be further empowered in this process.

173. Another member cited the increasing costs as an example of self indulgence and double counting and also a means by which to satisfy insurance motives, i.e. risk aversion. It was not a matter of security trying to impose views on the SMT but also a matter of SMT indulgence. He did not believe that those resident in a particular country should be preparing MORSS and that further thought should be given to other benefits and entitlements that compensate for costs of living, such as the hardship allowance and post adjustment.
174. Another member offered that it was not an easy process to pass a MOSS and MORSS submission through an SMT who are given 10 days to consider it, particularly as those costs detract from the local budget and hence from programs. Another pointed to the advantage of MORSS and cited Kenya as an example where, due to many of the MORSS measures that had been instituted, there had been a reduction in house invasions. Further, a current pilot program for lump-summing MOSS was apparently working. It was added that country representatives were often more contentious in approving MOSS and MORSS and that sometimes this needed to go through two or three SMT meetings. He hoped requests would go through the SFPs before being sent to the SMTs. For another member, MOSS was a very serious challenge, especially for smaller organizations. Hence, agency representatives on the ground should be encouraged to be an active part of the process. If there were problems this could be addressed to the representative in the SMT.

175. The Chair concluded that the size and cost of MOSS and MORSS were such that due diligence needed to be exercised. Great concern was expressed about how much money was being spent on those measures. Another member acknowledged that it might be premature to introduce a new process but nevertheless saw justification in having external parties play a more proactive and determining role in considering MOSS requests.

**Recommendation:**

176. The IASMN endorsed the approval process that WHO proposed for both MOSS and MORSS.

**L. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Policy Development**

177. The IASMN was informed that the UN secretariat’s Policy Committee, at its 13 July 2010 meeting, decided that “DSS will, in consultation with DPKO, DPA and all other relevant UN agencies, coordinate and facilitate the development of a comprehensive policy on the UN’s approach to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that are part of active hostilities and target UN personnel and facilities. The policy will be in line with humanitarian principles and take into account the experiences of IACG-MA [Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action] members.”

178. It was explained to the IASMN that DSS started the process of consultation for the development of this policy by first consulting with representatives of IACG-MA. Subsequently meetings were held between DSS and IACG-MA representatives from OCHA, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and DPKO. The notes from these meetings, as well as further background information on the issue of IEDs was provided to IASMN members. It is to be noted that this issue had also been brought to the attention of the IASMN during one of its bi-weekly teleconferences during which participants requested further information.

179. The IASMN was requested to review and discuss the key issues surrounding the development of a security policy on IEDs, including the nature and extent of IASMN participation in the development of such a policy.
180. One member expressed doubt as to whether the development of any policy on IEDs would in fact assist with the practical application of dealing with IEDs while another member took the view that it would be important for the IASMN to be involved in the process to ensure the broadest possible input and another cited the importance for the policy to cover training, how to identify markings and reporting.

**Recommendation:**

181. The IASMN agrees that the development of an IED policy be examined at the security inter-agency level through an IASMN working group which, due to the upcoming policy committee meeting on this subject, needs to be continued as a matter of priority.

**M. Draft Model Host Country Security Agreement**

182. The IASMN at its 13th session was provided with a revised copy of the Host Country Security Agreement and informed that a letter, together with instructions and the Agreement would be sent by the USG, DSS to the Designated Officials of 15 countries selected to represent a global collective view of security, requesting feedback within 60 days on the feasibility of developing host country security agreements. At its 14th session, the IASMN was informed that the feedback received was very poor – with most not responding at all and of the very few who had responded, with the exception of one country, the feedback was negative – from both Designated Officials and Member States. Furthermore, the IASMN Steering Group at its last meeting in Panama at the end of 2010, having considered that this effort was not receiving enough support and recalling that two previous initiatives that had been launched which had yielded similarly disappointing results, i.e. exploring the ideas of creating host country liaison committees and host country supplemental agreements, concluded that other means needed to be found to strengthen relations with host country authorities and that there was no point in pursuing this pilot any further.

183. It was recalled that these initiatives had been driven by the need to fulfil recommendations arising from the Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations Staff and Premises (aka the Brahimi Report), in particular “that a working group of senior UN officials led by the USG/DSS and Member States should urgently propose practical guidance for a best practice mechanism to help ensure “buy in” by all Member States into the requirements of protecting UN staff and premises worldwide.”

184. The IASMN was requested to consider ending the pilot on Model Host Country Security Agreements and to adopt the recommendation of its Steering Group to take a different track to strengthen relations with host country authorities that would encompass a more holistic approach which should include, among other measures, a number of enhancements to training, compliance with security policies and procedures, as well as enhanced communications with Member States.

185. The Chair reminded the IASMN that the SLS and the SRA had been designed to be shared with the Host Country, including with national police and analysts. He recognized that, with the exception of those countries where host country relations were already satisfactory, there was a
need to continue to work on strengthening host country relations in a more holistic way, to identify where the problems are and to work on those. It was clear that a formalized means of trying to create agreements had not worked. IASMN members did not object to this proposal and fully supported the need to adopt a holistic approach and enhanced dialogue with Member States.

**Recommendation:**

186. The IASMN agreed to end the pilot on Model Host Country Security Agreements taking account of DSS’ report that the original concept behind the establishment of such agreements had been examined and that the consensus from both officials within the UNSMS as well as those host countries participating in the pilot indicated that any further efforts to advance this concept would not be well received.

187. The IASMN agreed therefore to exploring different means by which to strengthen relations with host country authorities that would encompass a more holistic approach which should include, among other measures, a number of enhancements to training, compliance with security policies and procedures, as well as enhanced communications with Member States.

**N. HLCM Working Group on Program Criticality**

188. UNICEF presented a comprehensive overview of the work of the HLCM working group on Program Criticality. IASMN members were reminded that the TORs for this group called for the establishment of a common framework for decision making within the Guidelines for Acceptable Risk, as well as the establishment of definitions. It was intended that a proposed framework for decision making be presented to the HLCM at its Fall 2011 session.

189. Specific issues that the WG was examining were explained, e.g. viewing program criticality from the vantage point of the impact on the local population and the need for a mechanism to be in place by which to address an impasse in difficult conditions (e.g. an EGS on program criticality). A large part of the process centred on ensuring persons felt they had input into the process. Program criticality levels and the design objectives of a draft framework had been established, i.e. that it be globally applicable, user friendly, and viable.

190. Plans were underway to field test the devised model in a couple of locations and it was intended that the CEB would be provided with a preliminary report on the work of the WG at its April meeting in Nairobi. It was also clarified that the specialized agencies were in fact participating in the working group, albeit at varying degrees of involvement.

191. One member was heartened by the discussion on criticality and looked forward to having this new tool. He cautioned however that whatever is concluded not be overly prescriptive and be kept case specific and simple as the element of peer pressure would be incredibly powerful when going through this process. A structured coherent way to manage risks was needed. Another member was very impressed by the progress made so far and saw this as aiding her organization during some of the more difficult situations that may arise. She recognized that this will be an interesting issue from the staff side as well.
192. It was explained that the tool was not in fact prescriptive but rather something that may be used to explain why the UN system operates where it does and what it is doing. It was also emphasized that it would be important to ensure staff retain the option of knowing exactly what situation they may face and what they would be getting into by accepting a particular assignment. The Chair explained that as the USG, DSS he retained the authority to approve or disapprove putting persons into particular situations and would not use a tool that was too restrictive. What was important was to know that thought has gone into this and that due diligence backstopped any decisions. The tool should be far from prescriptive but rather provide a thoughtful process by which decisions may be made and upheld.

Recommendation:

193. The IASMN thanked UNICEF for chairing the WG, supported the concepts presented, welcomed the progress made so far and looked forward to further reports on this issue at its next session by which time the preliminary results of the WG’s work will have been considered by both HLCM and CEB.

O. Training of Security Focal points

194. The representative of UNIDO recalled that in 2006/7, while working on the Advanced Security in the Field Course, different training modalities for SFPs had been discussed and that it was concluded, including with DSS, that it would be useful to have SFP training in place. With today’s challenging security situations, new UNSMS policies being implemented and many new SFPs within the IASMN, this need was even greater, as was the need for providing training certification. He informed the IASMN that some external auditors had proposed that SFPs receive some specialized training. This could consist of two parts – a general module on rules of procedures, policies, etc. to encompass both the field and HQ structure and another module devoted to security basics. While UNIDO complemented TDS, DSS for its SSAFE training, the number of workshops on different policies and its training for DOs, there was still a need for SFP training which would also provide the opportunity to SFPs to exchange ideas and experiences.

195. For DSS this came down to an issue of resources. Nevertheless, UNIDO was interested in receiving the opinions of colleagues in the IASMN on this suggestion with a view to pushing this idea forward. One member pointed out that a lot of the components mentioned already existed as part of the SEP training. Another member pointed to the need to ensure adequate training for SFPs in high risk locations, especially those with no medical emergency facilities and that the discussion should be broadened to encompass security training for women. In this respect, he suggested that it would be prudent to reconvene the IASMN working group on training.

196. Another member proposed perhaps focusing on specific key issues and the option of SFPs attending the CSA/CSO workshops. He also believed there was a need to raise the level of training to the managerial level.

197. The Chair proposed that UNIDO request TDS, DSS to conduct a quick survey to ascertain the level of interest for this idea, what kind of higher level training would be desirable and also
the level of expertise that members could offer. UNIDO further suggested that the idea of tagging on a one day high level management oriented training module at the end of one of the IASMN regular sessions might be considered. One member added that a requisite level of training might even be established as a mandatory requirement to participate in the IASMN.

**Recommendation:**

198. The IASMN agreed to the concept that training be provided to security focal points. In order to move forward with this, DSS will conduct a survey on the training needs of SFPs, to be made available on UNSMIN.

**P. Strategic Direction of the UNSMS – Status of IASMN Working Groups**

199. There was an extensive discussion about which IASMN working groups would need to continue and which would need to be established to progress issues requiring further development and consideration. Instead of approaching this through ad hoc working groups, one member suggested that approaches be developed as part of an ongoing process that would allow for input on issues by IASMN members on a more regular basis. One such way could be through establishing standing working groups. Another member pointed to the need for the involvement of senior personnel at the field level in any issues covered or to be covered in working groups. The Chair, considering the security staffing shortfall in some AFPOs, informed the IASMN that it would not be feasible to convene a great number of working groups, all meeting concurrently. Therefore, an examination was needed of which issues could be supported this year and which could be put off for a year.

200. The IASMN identified the following issues for which further work was required by either an existing or a newly-formed IASMN working group:

**Training**

201. The IASMN agreed with its Steering Group’s assessment that there was a need to (re)-establish a working group on training within the next three to four months. One of the issues to be considered was alternative methods of delivering training. It was also confirmed that WSAT would be put on UNSMIN and that WFP could be further needed to develop specific women’s training. A needs assessment would also be conducted to assess the training needs of SFPs.

**Women’s Security**

202. In view of the fact that the policies and guidelines developed by the WFP working group that developed WSAT were adequate, the IASMN deemed that there was no need to reconvene this working group or to establish a new working group devoted solely to women’s security training. However, as mentioned above, it could be the case that WFP may be called upon to further develop WSAT, but this could be done within the context of the IASMN Training WG. Although it was decided that there was no need to reconvene a working group on the security of women and that any training issues would be dealt with in the IASMN training working group, it
was acknowledged that sexual violence and the fear of the danger of sexual assault may drive different approaches to be taken towards training women on security issues.

**Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS)**

203. The Chair informed the IASMN that that he would like to achieve a system whereby everyone in the UNSMS is able to report on one system incidents occurring worldwide, with DSS maintaining the database but with the ability to draw out information for each AFPO and a means by which all may view the global figures if needed. Such a system would ideally also include, if possible to obtain, information on incidents affecting NGOs. The Chair emphasized that whatever system was established, it was important that it was user friendly so it does not take too much time for security officers to complete a report. The Chair would like to see this system initially rolled out and usable by July 2011 and, allowing for any further adjustments, eventually up and functioning completely by January 2012.

204. WFP informed the IASMN that as of 1 January 2011, it had launched its security incident reporting system and as such did not think it was unrealistic that there could be in place a global system within 6 months.

205. It was decided that a working group should be established to progress this issue. Provisional Members: UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, OCHA and DSS.

**Human Resources Issues**

206. It was decided that a working group should be established to examine the report produced by the external consultant that had been hired by DSS to undertake a holistic review of human resources elements within DSS. Members of the IASMN who expressed interest in joining this working group included: UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, DPKO, UNFPA and HR Network. In addition, the two staff federations, FICSA and CCISUA also expressed interest in being part of this working group once established.

**MOSS/MORSS**

207. It was decided that DSS produces TORS for a working group on MOSS/MORSS.

**Likelihood**

208. The IASMN was informed that a working group on Likelihood was already established which is chaired by DSS and includes UNICEF, WFP, DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNFPA and DSS (including one CSA in the field) and would report back on its work to the next IASMN Steering Group meeting.

**Security Risk Assessment (SRA)**
209. It was suggested that instead of convening a separate working group to examine the current format of SRAs and how this may be improved, that this issue be examined by the Likelihood Working Group.

**Program Criticality**

210. The working group on this issue has been established by HLCM and is chaired by UNICEF. The IASMN will continue to be apprised of its activities and a report for the 22nd session of the HLCM is expected.

**Surge Emergency Crisis Funding**

211. There was no decision to form a working group on this issue, primarily due to the fact that financial expertise was best sought in another forum. In this respect, the suggestion was made that the HLCM Finance and Budget Working Group on Safety and Security Costs examine this issue further when it has completed its present work.

**Private Security Companies**

212. An IASMN working group was established to assist in the preparation of the submission for the UN secretariat’s Policy Committee meeting on this issue, to be held 12 April 2011. Further action to be taken by the IASMN and whether a new working group on PSCs will need to be established will be discussed following the outcome of the PC meeting.

**Geographic Information Systems (GIS)**

213. The Chair expressed the need for a working group on GIS although it was suggested that this issue could initially be considered by the SIRS working group. WFP pointed out that the GIS community already regularly exchanged information and that currently efforts were underway to develop a global system. It has yet to be determined who has ownership of the information. WFP took the view that, from the security perspective, GIS specialists should not be hired to provide GIS software but that operatives needed to be enabled to create maps to pull that centralized information from a centralized database and then present it for analysis. The IASMN was also informed that DSS’ Information Management Unit is already part of a working group on GIS. The Chair clarified that this issue was not about maps but about information – in fact it was a move away from voluminous reports to presenting information in a quick fast format to be used to make decisions. This was about changing philosophically the way the world is working. Provisional Members of GIS Working Group: UNICEF, WFP, OCHA, and DSS.

**Vehicle Tracking**

214. WFP offered to submit a CRP on this issue for the next session of the IASMN and, together with UNICEF offered to lead this working group with the participation of DPKO’s transport section. WFP was requested to revert at the next steering group meeting with ideas on what it wished the IASMN to support with respect to fleet management. It is to be noted that one

---

1 The Policy Committee on Private Security Companies is now scheduled to be held on 17 May 2011.
member suggested this issue be framed as fleet management rather than vehicle tracking to take into account the sensitivities of some Member States. The Chair supported that there should be a small working group convened for a limited duration to compile information on this issue.

**Procurement of Security Equipment**

215. The IASMN was informed that there already exists a working group on this subject which is chaired by UNICEF. The group met in August 2010 and agreed on sharing information. So far, DPKO and WFP had shared information on 17 security related items that had been identified. This information was put on the IASMN and procurement network websites. There was a request this should also be posted on UNSMIN.

**Blast Assessment**

216. It was decided that there would be a need for a working group on blast assessment but first the Chair indicated that he would like to arrange for a blast engineer to conduct a presentation for IASMN members. Membership of the working group is to be decided.

**IED**

217. The IASMN was informed of the need for DSS to feed into the Policy Committee meeting on this subject (date of PC meeting still undetermined). As such, there was a need for the working group on this issue to continue and for it to expand its membership to include IASMN representation.

**PVQ Results and UN Premises Policy**

218. The IASMN decided that there was a need for a working group to comprehensively study the results of the PVQ and the draft UN Premises Policy. Provisional members: UNDP, WFP, ILO, WIPO, UNFPA and DSS.

**Recommendation:**

219. The IASMN identified a number of issues for which further work is required on a security inter-agency basis and for which IASMN working groups either need to be established or for which already established IASMN working groups may examine some of the issues requiring further development.

220. The IASMN agreed that DSS would further review the list of issues discussed, prioritize these accordingly and revert with a detailed schedule for both existing and new IASMN working groups.

**Q. Medical Directors’ Network (MDN) update on Occupational Health and Safety and Medical Emergency Preparedness**
221. The Chair of the Medical Director’s Network gave a presentation on several aspects of occupational health and safety and medical emergency preparedness in the UN system. While there was no shortage of health care resources in the UN system, there were certain areas in Europe, Africa and Asia where medical coordination oversight was needed over medical and health care services. The services available included the Mobile Training Team in DSS and CISMU; in DFS there was a medical support service with clinics under the management of DFS; other counsellors in the system; global dispensaries; UN examining physicians and specialists dealing with specific diseases (e.g. UN influenza system coordinator). What was lacking was coordination of all these elements. There were approximately 100 medical dispensaries and clinics with all reporting to the Medical Services Division. Doctors employed outside of the national health care services who operated in this system were not supported by a management infrastructure. e.g. Ministry of health.

222. A Medical Directors’ WG took initiatives to push solutions forward. A number of reports were submitted through IASMN to HLCM. In February 2009, in response to the Brahimi report, the issues were brought to HLCM with a focus on emergency response. A broader paper followed addressing the need for a management system for healthcare in the UN. Last year, a paper had been tabled that shifted the focus from just providing medical services to a multi-disciplinary approach to occupational health and safety. In February 2009, a specific recommendation was made to HLCM to launch a system-wide study to examine these issues - to include medical issues in MOSS and establish a program to ensure that medical emergency and mass casualty management plans become part of the routine business of field duty stations.

223. The IASMN was further informed that the operationalisation of the UNMERT (United Nations Medical Emergency Response Team) concept had never been fully realized because it was never funded since its approval in 2004. Although HLCM endorsed the UNMERT proposals, it requested that the financial requirements be covered through savings from the cost shared portion of the biennial budget for the UNSMS.

224. The Chair of the MDN recognized that sometimes the connection between decisions taken on an inter-agency (e.g. HLCM level) on funding mechanisms and those taken by the GA were sometimes tenuous and difficult to manage. He was grateful for the support provided by DSS in terms of mobile medical training that managed to take some issues forward. A great deal of activity had occurred in 2009 and 2010 (e.g. hands-on simulated training in Brindisi 2009/10). This training culminated in internationally recognised certification for the doctors. This was particularly important for doctors taken out of the system who were no longer monitored by any national standard. In 2010, table top simulations within a UN emergency response environment were held. This year, there was a need to carry out a real simulated training exercise, modified according to lessons learnt. The first formalized UNMERT training had been conducted in 2008 but only one-off funding was provided for this. Centralized, sustainable funding was now only provided to MSD for this biennium (with a series of courses planned for next year), but training needed to be encouraged between medical teams at HQ and field teams, to create a feeling of community and cooperation.

225. The Chair of the MDN informed IASMN members of another initiative undertaken which was the establishment by the UN Secretariat of the Emergency Preparedness and Support team.
The idea had emerged after the Baghdad and Algiers attacks which highlighted the institutional problems victims faced in the aftermath of a malicious attack. There was no entity coordinating the concerns of victims and families and no concerted means by which they could access necessary services. The UN Secretariat’s Working Group on Staff Humanitarian Affairs had presented recommendations to the Secretary-General for a survivor and family support unit to be established at Headquarters. This subsequently resulted in the establishment of the emergency preparedness and support team which includes an HR team to handle the welfare and administrative aspects of survivors and family members and a team in MSD to address medical issues. Recruitment for a new P5 to join the team was underway. The establishment of the team were intended to foster a supportive and sympathetic UN environment for helping people on an ongoing basis once persons were subject to malicious acts.

226. Turning once more to the issue of UNMERT, it was explained that the team needed to be trained and to have practiced on planning before a crisis. UNMERT as a concept had important ongoing and pre crisis activities. Normally during a crisis, two or three doctors would be deployed, together with a nurse and administrative support to monitor what was going on locally. On the ground, doctors were split between working with the victims and fulfilling reporting requirements so the arrival of an UNMERT served to relieve their load. Following the crisis, different levels of medical evacuation and care are required, including rehabilitation and coordinating psycho social support activities. With the emergency response team, it was hoped to have a core of people dedicated to pre, during and after crisis activities. In addition, the emergency response team was working with some of the survivors from the Canal Hotel bombing on outstanding issues. Some medical specialists had returned to Baghdad so there were now more options available for providing medical treatment within Iraq.

227. The IASMN was informed that the current challenges are for sustainable funding and the process of shifting UN thinking to support the UN medical services focusing on coordinated medical management. In this respect, the Chair of the MDN informed the meeting that the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) had undertaken a review of all the medical services available in the UN system. A review of the JIU key points will be considered by the GA at the end of 2011. The review recognized that the current medical management and accountability structures did not meet requirements. The review also strongly endorsed that occupational health and safety is a managed and multi disciplinary activity with many groups needing to contribute and all organizations needing to promulgate further health and safety policies. If AFPOs have not already done so, the IASMN was informed that there will be pressure from the GA to do so. There was also a firm proposal in the report that the Secretary-General establish a medical inter-agency network, based on the IASMN model. The single priority for the MDN was to improve the UN’s ability to managed scattered field medical services.

228. The Chair, MSD further emphasized that it was important for people to think about risk management in terms of medical conditions and medical care and that the mindset in the healthcare environment needed to be changed. It was further mentioned that medical issues be linked to DSS’ threat and risk analysis.

229. One of the staff federations pointed out that it had consistently asked for the consideration of health and safety issues in the IASMN since 2005. There had been a lot of debate about
where responsibility falls and there must be acceptance that there will be a cross-over of safety issues between DSS and MSD. It was noted that there were some internationally recognized qualifications that can be rolled out and standardization would allow each SSS department one person to have knowledge on occupational health and safety. It was proposed that the IASMN consider the options with a view to establishing internal provisions for this to be spread across all duty stations.

230. DPKO-DFS indicated that the departments were engaged in an ongoing development of a field safety management system and that the departments would be prepared to share the developmental outcomes with the IASMN at its next session. The Chair of the MSD cited the fact that the UN secretariat’s Policy Committee will look at formalizing a policy on occupational health and safety, and emphasized that this was not the responsibility of the medical unit but rather a managerial responsibility.

**Recommendation:**

231. The IASMN welcomed the briefing by the Medical Directors’ Network on the efforts taken so far to develop occupational health and safety policies for the UN system and on the progress made with respect to Medical Emergency Preparedness Response.

**R. Any other business**

**a) National Staff Screening and Vetting**

**Recommendation:**

232. The IASMN was reminded that at its 20th session in September 2010, the HLCM, on the recommendation of the 13th session of the IASMN, recognized that the establishment of any national security staff screening and vetting policy was a major issue impacting on a cross section of disciplines and decided to establish a working group under its auspices to move this issue forward. The IASMN took note of the fact that this working group had not yet been established and that it should remain apprised of this issue when there are further developments.

**b) Women’s Security Awareness Training (WSAT)**

**Recommendation:**

233. The IASMN acknowledged that the working group led by WFP to develop the programme for Women’s Security Awareness Training (WSAT) had concluded its work and finalized the WSAT course and looked forward to the availability of this course on the UNSMIN website.

234. The IASMN further concluded that there is no need at this juncture to consider security training for women in a separate working group but that instead there was a need to re-establish the IASMN Working Group on Training to address the quality and quantity of all UNDSS and AFP provided security-related training, as well as the standardization of such training throughout the UN system.
c) Road Safety

235. The IASMN was informed that GA Resolution 65/132 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel requested the Secretary-General and the UN system to continue to enhance road safety and to report to the GA at its next (66th) session on road safety accidents.¹

236. One member asked if the UN secretariat administrative instruction on Road Safety would be promulgated throughout the UN system. DSS proposed that, as a matter of priority, a policy on road safety would be drafted for the Security Policy Manual, to be considered at the next meeting of the IASMN Steering Group.

Recommendation:

237. The IASMN took note of and reaffirmed its support for that portion of the General Assembly Resolution on the Safety and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel wherein the GA requested that the Secretary-General and the UN system continue taking necessary measures in the field of road safety, including through improved training and initiatives to promote road safety in order to reduce road hazard incidents and to report on steps taken to strengthen data collection and analysis of road incidents, including on civilian casualties resulting from these accidents.

238. IASMN members agreed to reaffirm their own road safety campaigns within their respective organizations. At the same time, DSS would reinforce its own road safety campaign and provide for the next IASMN Steering Group, a draft section on Road Safety to be included in the Security Policy Manual which will encompass the UN Secretariat’s administrative instruction on Road Safety, as well as other road safety policy initiatives from IASMN members.

d) Membership of the IASMN Steering Group

239. The membership of the IASMN Steering Group was clarified to include WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, DPKO/DFS, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, OHCHR, FAO and WHO and UNESCO (as co-Chair).

e) UN Women

240. UNDP raised the issue of membership of UN Women in the UNSMS and that this should be formalized which would entail participation in the existing cost sharing arrangements. OLA confirmed that UN Women was indeed an independent agency and, as such, it has been renegotiating a great number of agreements with this new entity in the UN system.

Recommendation:

241. The IASMN requested that DSS initiate contact with UN Women with a view to discussing its participation in the IASMN as well as the anticipated cost-sharing implications for the
UNSMS that are posed by the fact that UN Women has been established as a new agency in the UN system.

**f) Update on events in the Middle East and North Africa**

242. In view of current events, DSS provided a short update to IASMN members on the situation in the region. The Chair, noted that whereas in 2009, terrorist attacks prevailed, and in 2010, natural disasters prevailed, in 2011, it was likely that events would be dominated by civil disorder. He believed that the UNSMS could withstand this, especially as the system was maturing in terms of its ability to analyze, discuss and disseminate information on the wide variety of emerging threats. At present, there were approximately 65-75 analysts in the system and it was important to ensure that everyone was using the same risk analysis process for which many AFPOs had already been trained. While it was not the intention to stifle individual creativity, there was a need to acknowledge a common framework for analysis.

**S. Other Matters**

243. a) HLCM 21st session, 8 - 9 March 2011, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris

b) CEB, 1 - 2 April 2011, UNEP, Nairobi

c) Steering Group and IASMN meeting schedule
   i. Spring Session IASMN Steering Group, 2 - 4 May 2011, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris
   ii. 15th Session IASMN, 27 to 30 June 2011, IFAD Headquarters, Rome

d) HLCM 22nd session, TBD

e) CEB Fall Session, TBD

---

“Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations system to continue taking necessary measures to enhance road safety, including through improved training and initiatives to promote road safety so as to reduce incidents caused by road hazards, and also requests the Secretary-General to report on the steps taken to strengthen data collection on and analysis of road incidents, including civilian casualties resulting from road accidents;”